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People tend to postpone work previously planned
for the present, revising earlier plans despite a com-
plete lack of new relevant information and sometimes
even despite costs of doing so. Likewise, people some-
times commit to deadlines, choosing to constrain their
future options even despite potential costs from not
being able to respond to new information. Akerlof
(1991, p. 7) argues that “a major function of man-
agement is to   monitor accomplishment so as to
prevent procrastination” in both project initiation and
project termination. And a large number of financial
advice books and websites deal with how individual
investors can automate decisions such as saving to
avoid mistakes from procrastination.1
Economic theory has made significant progress in
explaining this type of behavior as arising as a result
of preferences, either because of time inconsistency as
in models of quasihyperbolic discounting (e.g., Laibson
1 See, for example, Ashraf et al. (2006) and http://www.apa.org/
helpcenter/willpower-finances.aspx (accessed February 27, 2015).
1997) or because of temptation as in the revealed-
preference approach of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
However, psychological evidence suggests that it is
not only the utility or disutility of certain actions that
generates these behaviors but also misperceptions of the
probabilities of future events. According to Kahneman
and Tversky (1982, p. 415),
The context of planning provides many examples in
which the distribution of outcomes in past experience is
ignored. Scientists and writers, for example, are noto-
riously prone to underestimate the time required to
complete a project, even when they have consider-
able experience of past failures to live up to planned
schedules.
In this paper, we develop a structural theory based
on optimistic beliefs about the future and show that it
naturally leads to these behaviors. Relative to earlier
work, we allow beliefs to be updated in a non-Bayesian
fashion, and we demonstrate that such a theory can
not only match observed patterns in behavior, but
also observed patterns in beliefs. We derive a number
of predictions of our theory that are supported by
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existing experimental evidence from the psychology
literature. Our theory predicts that optimal beliefs
are optimistic and that people optimally exhibit the
planning fallacy (consistent with the findings of Roy
et al. 2005), that incentives for rapid task completion
make beliefs more optimistic (consistent with Byram
1997) whereas incentives for accurate task duration
prediction make beliefs less optimistic (consistent with
Byram 1997, Buehler et al. 1997), and that people
optimally self-impose deadlines that improve work
smoothing less than externally imposed deadlines
(consistent with Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002). Our
theory also predicts that monetary incentives that affect
beliefs also affect behavior; this prediction can be used
to perform additional experimental tests to differentiate
our model of optimal time-inconsistent beliefs from
existing models of time-inconsistent preferences.
Our theory is based on the trade-off between opti-
mism, which raises anticipatory utility, and objectivity,
which promotes efficient actions. An individual’s cur-
rent utility depends on his expectations about the
course of the future, so optimistic beliefs make him
happier. But such beliefs come at a cost: the chosen
actions are optimal given these optimistic beliefs, but
they can be objectively suboptimal. Optimal beliefs
balance the anticipatory benefit with the efficiency
cost, but since these vary from one period to another,
optimal beliefs are time inconsistent (making our theory
distinct from Brunnermeier and Parker 2005). Since
people understand that their plans of action are time
inconsistent, they choose to constrain future actions by
utilizing commitment devices.
Although our theory is general, we present it in the
context of planning. By focusing on planning, we can
use existing evidence from the psychology literature
on the planning fallacy—i.e., people’s tendency to
underestimate the time necessary to complete tasks and
therefore to make suboptimal plans—and on the use of
deadlines to evaluate our theory’s implications with
observed behavior and, importantly, beliefs. Further,
we can contrast our theory with theories that assume
time-inconsistent preferences. The predictions of these
models differ, both in terms of beliefs and in terms of
behavior. Evidence on beliefs is particularly important
for our theory, in which beliefs play a central role
and belief biases are endogenously determined by
preferences and the economic environment.
More specifically, we consider a three-period model
of the behavior and beliefs of an agent who plans
when and how much to work in order to complete
a task of uncertain total difficulty. The agent first
has the option to constrain himself by imposing an
intermediate deadline and then chooses how to allocate
his work among the remaining two periods in order to
complete the task. Decisions maximize the expected
present-discounted value of utility, including utility
from anticipation, given subjective beliefs, and optimal
subjective beliefs maximize the well-being—the “lifetime”
discounted utility averaged over the states of the world.
Well-being is evaluated using objective beliefs so that it
captures the trade-off between distorting beliefs and
distorting actions across realizations of uncertainty.
In the absence of a commitment device, the model
has two features that form the agent’s optimal beliefs
and behavior, which are characterized by optimism and
the planning fallacy. First, the agent has anticipatory
utility, so if he believes the task to be easy, he is happier
in the present because he anticipates less work in the
future. This ingredient provides an anticipatory benefit
of optimistic beliefs. Second, the agent chooses optimal
actions given his beliefs, so if he has optimistic beliefs,
he does little work in the present and ends up poorly
smoothing work over time. This ingredient implies
a cost of optimism on average. Given these features,
people exhibit optimism, because it has first-order
anticipatory benefits and, by the envelope theorem,
only second-order behavioral costs. Thus, in our theory,
optimism and the planning fallacy are endogenous,
and the larger the severity of these biases, the greater
the anticipatory benefits of optimism and the smaller
the costs of misplanning.
If, in the presence of a commitment device, beliefs
become more optimistic over time and the individual
understands the resulting tendency to postpone work,
he may impose a binding deadline on his future self.
Given a deadline, the individual can still receive the
anticipatory benefits of believing the task will be easy
without suffering as high costs of poorly smoothing
work over time. Thus, beliefs that induce a binding
deadline may make the agent better off on average,
so they may be optimal. As above, the individual’s
beliefs and his choice of deadline are endogenous and
situational, giving different predictions across different
environments.
The predictions of our model are generally consistent
with experimental and survey data on beliefs and task
durations reported in the psychology literature on the
planning fallacy. (i) Our model predicts that beliefs are
optimistic and people suffer from the planning fallacy.
There is a wealth of evidence, starting with Kahneman
and Tversky (1982), that supports these predictions.
(ii) Our model predicts that, without commitment,
beliefs become less optimistic over time. This is con-
sistent with the finding by Gilovich et al. (1993), for
example, that people become less optimistic about their
performance as the time of performance approaches.
As predicted by our model, Ariely and Wertenbroch
(2002) find that (iii) when people are given an oppor-
tunity to impose a deadline on themselves prior to
beginning a task, most do so, and that (iv) people
self-impose deadlines that are less strict and increase
performance less than externally imposed deadlines.
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Finally, our model predicts that (v) monetary incentives
for rapid task completion increase the planning fallacy,
and (vi) monetary incentives for accurate prediction
of task duration reduce the planning fallacy. These
predictions match the evidence by Buehler et al. (1997),
for example. In addition to presenting a substantial
body of evidence that is consistent with our model’s
results, we derive novel, but testable, predictions. For
example, our theory predicts that if people choose to
impose a deadline, they should still hold optimistic
beliefs; in fact, beliefs should become more optimistic
over time. We also derive comparative statics with
respect to the model’s structural parameters.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on
commitment. In one branch of the literature, people
discount nonexponentially in an otherwise standard
time-separable utility maximization problem (following
Strotz 1955);2 in the other branch, people maximize
preferences that have an additional component, temp-
tation utility, that makes it unpleasant to make optimal
decisions (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001).3 In either case,
procrastination occurs because the utility function
places special importance on the present relative to the
future.4 In some of these models, people are exoge-
nously assumed to partially (as in O’Donoghue and
Rabin 2001) or completely (as in Laibson 1997) under-
stand their tendency to procrastinate and therefore
choose to constrain their future choices. By contrast,
in our theory, beliefs, rather than preferences, are the
central cause of these interesting behaviors, and impor-
tantly, the propensity to commit is not assumed but
rather arises endogenously as optimal behavior as a
result of incentives. Compared with preference-based
models, our theory clearly yields different testable
predictions in terms of beliefs; for example, it predicts
2 Related to this branch of the literature, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005)
explain preference reversals as instinctual behavior as a result of
natural selection. With standard preferences, optimal behavior in
environments with uncertainty—which are most commonly faced
by animals—becomes instinctual; hence, it is exhibited even in
environments without uncertainty. The authors argue that such
behavior would be indistinguishable from behavior arising as a
result of nonexponential discounting.
3 Epstein (2006) interprets this temptation utility as the expected
utility from incorrect beliefs and shows that if beliefs are a mix of
the correct and incorrect beliefs, they may not be Bayesian; therefore
people may exhibit a preference for commitment. Both the incorrect
beliefs and the precise mix of correct and incorrect beliefs that
an agent uses, therefore also non-Bayesian updating and attitudes
toward commitment, are exogenously assumed and embedded in the
preference primitives. Instead, in our model, non-Bayesian beliefs
and a preference for commitment arise endogenously as a result of
incentives.
4 The two alternatives’ predictions for behavior are similar. Also, as
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) argue, nonexponential discounting models
are more widely used in economic applications, whereas temptation
models belong more narrowly to the choice theory literature. As a
result, we focus on the former.
that beliefs about the total work necessary for task
completion are optimistic and are affected by incentives
for accuracy of prediction, speed of completion, etc. But,
interestingly, our theory also yields some different pre-
dictions in terms of behavior. First, since beliefs affect
optimal actions, incentives (e.g., the aforementioned
monetary incentives for the accuracy of prediction of
task duration) that affect optimal beliefs also affect
optimal actions; this is not the case in models with
time-inconsistent preferences, since beliefs are assumed
to be rational. Second, our model predicts that the
optimal work, the optimal deadline, and the propensity
to choose a deadline vary with the structural model
parameters in different ways than in a model with
present-biased preferences.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is also
related to research that endogenizes beliefs, such as
Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Yariv (2002), and Bénabou
and Tirole (2002). More closely related to our work,
Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) and Ko˝szegi (2006)
present models in which people choose to process or
collect information not only to make better decisions
but also to get utility from anticipation or their self-
image. In Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), agents derive
direct utility from changes in beliefs (i.e., news) and
make time-inconsistent plans as long as preferences
place special importance on present relative to future
news. By contrast, our paper does not focus on the
mechanism through which belief distortions occur;
rather, it concentrates on the optimality of beliefs,
which turn out to be time inconsistent. Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005) also focus on the optimality of beliefs,
but the model and focus of this paper are different.
First, we do not constrain subjective beliefs to be
time consistent; this makes our theory more generally
applicable, allows us to better explain the evolution
of beliefs over time, and gives rise to the optimality
of preference for commitment. Second, agents in our
model care about future consumption not only because
they gain immediate utility from anticipating it but also
because they care about their future selves through the
traditional discount factor. Even though this assumption
does not affect our qualitative results regarding the
evolution of beliefs and preference for commitment, it
has a couple of distinct advantages: (i) it enables us
to explore a direct comparison between our model of
time-inconsistent beliefs and its implications versus
the model of time-inconsistent preferences (which
necessarily incorporates the traditional discount factor)
and its implications, which is a central part of our
paper; and (ii) it enables us to derive comparative
statics with respect to the traditional discount factor,
which is a standard and important component of
individual preferences.
To see more clearly the distinction between the time-
inconsistent preferences model, the optimal-beliefs
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model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), and our
theory, some readers may find it useful to consider
an application of our model in a context different
from the planning context that we use to develop
our theory. For example, consider the real options
framework of investment under uncertainty, in which
an entrepreneur chooses the optimal time to make an
investment by balancing the cost of preemption by
another entrepreneur with the benefit of delaying the
investment in the hope that the (lump-sum) payoff
will be larger in the future. Grenadier and Wang (2007)
show that, with time-inconsistent preferences, the
agent would invest earlier than with time-consistent
preferences because he is impatient. On the other hand,
with optimal time-consistent beliefs (as in Brunnermeier
and Parker 2005), he would be optimistic about the
payoff’s future realizations; hence he would invest
later than with rational beliefs. Finally, in the theory of
optimal time-inconsistent beliefs that we propose, the
agent would still invest later than with rational beliefs,
but the key distinction is that he would self-impose
a binding deadline that would force him to invest
earlier (though not as early as with rational beliefs);
furthermore, the agent would become more optimistic
over time, since a binding deadline eliminates the cost
of dreaming.
The empirical contribution of this paper is related to
economic research that develops a scientific foundation
for modeling beliefs. In general, observed behavior can
be matched by several combinations of preferences and
beliefs. The common approach to this identification
problem is to assume rational beliefs, perhaps based
on philosophical arguments,5 and to propose models
that match evidence on behavior. We instead address
this identification problem by using evidence both on
behavior and on beliefs; the implications of our model
are largely consistent with the patterns of behavior
and beliefs found in experiments on the planning
fallacy. This finding supports our model, as well as
the use of survey data on beliefs to discipline research
in behavioral economics. In a (broadly) similar vein,
some papers have used survey data on beliefs to test
rationality or to evaluate its usefulness in the context
of specific models (Manski 2004).6
Finally, since we present our theory in the context
of planning, our paper is related to the psychological
5 Two versions of such arguments bear mentioning. First, rationality
is sometimes viewed as providing evolutionary fitness. But this is
only true for specific environments and utility functions; that it is
not generally true follows directly from the identification problem.
Second, it is sometimes claimed that people learn true probabilities
over time; this simply pushes back the assumption of rationality to
one of rational learning, so it is still an assumption, not a scientific
basis for distinguishing models.
6 Also see Hamermesh (1985), Dominitz (1998), and Nyarko and
Schotter (2002).
theories of the planning fallacy, which focus on the
mental processes that lead people to make incorrect
predictions. These theories are generally consistent
with our theory and inconsistent with existing models
in the economics literature. Kahneman and Tversky
(1982) argue that the fallacy arises because people
ignore distributional information available in related
past outcomes and instead focus on a single plausible
and optimistic scenario for completion of the current
task. Trope and Liberman (2003) apply construal-level
theory to temporal distance to argue that people view
temporally distant events in terms of a few abstract
characteristics and so, when forming predictions, over-
look the potential difficulties and subtasks involved
in task completion. Further, several papers on the
planning fallacy have investigated whether it is caused
by incorrect memory of past events or biased self-
attribution (Buehler et al. 1994). Finally, there is the
general theory that people are optimistic, and this is
helpful in generating motivation, effort, and persistence
(e.g., Armor and Taylor 1998).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In §1,
we present our theory in the context of planning. In §2,
we present our results on optimism, overconfidence,
and the planning fallacy without a commitment device.
In §3, we show that people may exhibit preference
for commitment, caused entirely by optimal time-
inconsistent beliefs. In §4, we present comparative
statics results for optimal beliefs, actions, and deadlines
with respect to model parameters. In §5, we develop a
model with present-biased preferences, which allows
us then in §6 to compare our model’s predictions with
those from the model with present-biased preferences
and to discuss the relevant empirical evidence. The
appendix provides proofs of all propositions, and an
online appendix (available as supplemental material at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2360) provides
more detailed proofs of some propositions.
1. The Model
Here, we present our theory in the context of the task
completion problem. First, we present the environment,
and then we state the objectives. In short, optimal
actions maximize subjective expected utility, including
utility from anticipation, and optimal beliefs maxi-
mize the objective expected lifetime utility. That is, we
deviate from the standard economic model in two direc-
tions: utility is derived not only from consumption but
also from anticipation (Loewenstein 1987, Caplin and
Leahy 2001), and beliefs are subjective and maximize
a welfare function (Landier 2000, Brunnermeier and
Parker 2005). It is worth noting that we do not require
that beliefs are Bayesian. However, we retain rationality
in the sense that agents are fully sophisticated; i.e., they
know their preferences and beliefs in the present and in
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Figure 1 Timeline of Belief Formation, Action Choices, and Information Arrival
Beliefs are formed
Deadline  is chosen Action 1 is chosen
 is realized
Task is completed
210
t
the future, for all states of the world, and correctly take
these into account when making optimal decisions.
Our model is related to that of Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005) but differs in the following key respects.
First, we do not constrain subjective beliefs to be
Bayesian; this makes our theory more generally appli-
cable, allows us to explain the endogenous evolution
of beliefs over time, and gives rise to the optimality
of preference for commitment. Second, in our model,
agents care about future consumption not only because
they gain immediate utility from anticipating it but
also because they care about their future selves; this
makes our model more standard and enables us to
directly compare it with a model with time-inconsistent
preferences, as well as to calculate comparative statics
with respect to the traditional discount factor.
1.1. The Task Completion Environment
There are three periods: 0, 1, and 2. The total amount
of work required to complete the task is 1+, where
≥ 0 is a random variable realized in period 2, with
mean E = Ɛ > 0 and variance  = Ɛ2− Ɛ2 > 0,
where Ɛ ·  denotes the unconditional objective expec-
tation.7 At t = 1, the agent chooses work w1 ≤ 1,8
and at t = 2, he completes the task. So the resource
constraint is
w1 +w2 = 1+ (1)
At t= 0, the agent does not work but may have the
option to impose an interim deadline in the form of a
lower bound  on the amount of work w1 completed
in period 1. That is, he may impose
w1 ≥ 
The timeline presented in Figure 1 summarizes our
setup.
1.2. Optimal Actions
Our starting point is the standard assumption that opti-
mal actions maximize the subjective expected present-
discounted value of current and future utility; i.e., at
time t the individual chooses actions to maximize
Vt = Ɛˆt
[∑
≥t
−tU
]
 (2)
7 We normalize the known component of work required to 1, so  is
the relative size of the random component.
8 The constraint w1 ≤ 1 ensures that neither a rational agent nor
one with optimal beliefs chooses w1 > 1, leading to wasted work
for some , in which case our interpretation of the mathematical
structure is strained.
where Ɛˆt ·  denotes subjective expectation at time t,
Ut denotes utility at time t, and 0<≤ 1 is the con-
ventional discount factor.
Our point of departure from the standard model of
subjective expected utility is that—as proposed by early
economists such as Jeremy Bentham, David Hume,
and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and as assumed, for
example, in Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin and Leahy
(2001)—people’s present utility depends both on what
they currently consume and on what they anticipate
consuming in the future. The implication of incorporat-
ing utility from both sources—consumption as well as
anticipation—in U is that current utility is affected by
subjective expectations of future events, and people
can be happier by holding more optimistic beliefs as
well as by forming better plans.
In particular, we follow the literature on anticipatory
utility (see, e.g., Loewenstein 1987), and we define
utility U as the expected present-discounted value of
current and future consumption utility:
Ut = Ɛˆt
[∑
≥t
−tuw
]
 (3)
where uw =− 12w2 is the consumption utility the
agent directly experiences from doing work w (and
consuming the corresponding amount of leisure), and
0 <  ≤ 1 is the anticipatory discount factor.9 For
example, utility at t = 1 is U1 = Ɛˆ1uw1+uw2,
where uw1 is the consumption utility that is consid-
ered in standard economic models, and uw2 is the
anticipatory utility from savoring or dreading future
consumption.
It is important to distinguish between the conven-
tional discount factor  and the anticipatory discount
factor . The former is the discount factor that appears
in standard economic models and captures the degree to
which the agent cares about his future selves, whereas
the latter appears in models of anticipatory utility and
captures the degree to which he gains immediate utility
from anticipating future consumption. Indeed, with no
anticipatory utility (= 0) and objective expectations
9 The assumption that u is quadratic is important for tractability; it
implies that only the mean and variance of  matter, so it reduces
the dimensionality of the problem of solving for optimal beliefs. But
our qualitative results are more general; for example, restricting
attention to beliefs that can be completely ordered by first-order
stochastic dominance, we can show that they hold for a concave u.
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Figure 2 (Color online) Plots, for Various Values of the Conventional Discount Factor  and the Anticipatory Discount Factor , of the Compound Discount
Factor h−t  in Vt Applied to Consumption Utility of Time  , i.e.,  − t Periods in the Future
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
(a)  = 0.1 (b)  = 0.5 (c)  = 0.9
 – t
0 1 2 3 4 5
 – t
0 1 2 3 4 5
 – t
Notes. In all panels, the solid lines correspond to = 0, the dotted lines to = 01, the dash-dotted lines to = 025, and the dashed lines to = 05. The
compound discount factors are plotted for = 01 in panel (a), for = 05 in panel (b), and for = 09 in panel (c).
(Ɛˆt = Ɛt , where Ɛt is the objective expectation at time t),
our model reduces to the standard consumption model.
The inclusion of anticipatory utility with discount
factor  in an otherwise standard consumption model
generates a nonexponential compound discount factor
in the preferences represented by V . Using objective
beliefs and Equation (3) in Equation (2), we write
Vt = Ɛt
[∑
≥t
h−tuw
]

where h−t =
∑−t
k=0 
k−t−k is the complete homo-
geneous symmetric polynomial of degree  − t in 
and , i.e., the sum of all cross-terms of power  − t.10
For example, the compound discount factor applied to
consumption utility one period ahead is +, and the
one applied to consumption utility two periods ahead
is 2 + +2. We note that as long as + ≤ 1,
the compound discount factor does not exceed 1 for
any period. Figure 2 plots the compound discount
factor applied at period t to consumption utility that
is experienced  − t periods in the future, for various
values of the conventional discount factor  and the
anticipatory discount factor .
In all panels in the figure, the solid black line plots
the standard exponential discount factor, which corre-
sponds to the case of no anticipatory utility; i.e., = 0.
These plots demonstrate that, with  > 0, the com-
pound discount factor discounts the future less than the
standard exponential discount factor, hence introducing
a future bias in preferences. As a result, the optimal
work w1 from the time 0 perspective is smaller than
the optimal w1 from the time 1 perspective. It is crucial
10 This compound discount factor, h−t , is the devaluation factor
of Loewenstein (1987), with the difference that in that case utility
flows are continuous.
to note that this bias is the opposite of the present
bias assumed in the literature on time-inconsistent
preferences and cannot induce at t= 0 the choice of
a deadline of the form w1 ≥ ; as a result, it does
not affect our message that time-inconsistent beliefs
endogenously cause preference for commitment.11
1.3. Optimal Beliefs
In our model, agents may hold subjective beliefs that
may differ from objective beliefs. Formally, let  
be the measurable space with  the sample space
and  a -algebra of  representing the possible
events, and let  tt∈T with  s ⊂  t ⊂  , ∀s < t ∈ T ,
be a filtration representing information flow, with T
the time index set. Objective beliefs are represented
by the objective probability measure  on  , while
subjective beliefs at time t are represented by the  t-
measurable conditional probability measure ˆ t on  .
We use Ɛˆt to denote expectations given beliefs ˆ t and
information represented by  t . We assume that the
objective conditional probability measure  t =  ·   t
dominates ˆ t for all t (i.e.,  tA = 0 implies that
ˆ tA= 0 for A ∈  ), which ensures that the agent
understands the underlying model at all times and that
information that has been revealed is not forgotten.12
We also assume that the agent knows the full sequence
11 We note that if we are willing to assume that people also care
about the past, then it is possible to introduce anticipatory together
with memory utility, without introducing any time inconsistency in
preferences. Indeed, in §B.1 of the online appendix we extend our
model by introducing the possibility that the past also matters, and
we show that, as expected, all our results continue to hold in the
absence of this future bias.
12 Thinking in terms of a tree diagram, at time t the agent knows
which node has been reached, and his time t subjective beliefs assign
a probability to each of the nodes that can be reached from the
current node.
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of probability measures 8ˆt9t∈T ; this ensures that when
the agent at time t makes his optimal decision to
maximize Vt = Ɛˆt6
∑
≥t −tU 7, he correctly evaluates
the F -measurable utility U = Ɛˆ 6
∑
 ′≥ 
′−u4w ′57
at time  ≥ t using time  subjective beliefs ˆ , and
then he calculates the conditional expectation of the
discounted sum of current and future utilities using
time t beliefs and information.
Our innovation is that we do not place any restric-
tions on how ˆs and ˆt are related for s < t ∈ T . In
particular, given some F-measurable random vari-
able X, we do not require that Ɛˆs6X7= Ɛˆs6Ɛˆt6X77; that is,
the law of iterated expectations and Bayesian updating
may not hold. In the setup of §1.1, ì is the sample
space that dictates all the possible values of the ran-
dom variable ; 8Ft90≤t≤2 is the filtration generated
by  whose value is revealed at t = 2; the assumption
that ≥ 0 together with the assumption that t domi-
nates ˆt implies that ˆt4 < 05= 0, so that Ɛˆt67≥ 0;
and our innovation to not place restrictions on the rela-
tion between beliefs at different points in time implies
that we do not require Ɛˆ067= Ɛˆ167, even though no
information is revealed between t = 0 and t = 1. Our
framework provides the necessary structure that allows
us to relax the standard—but restrictive—assumption of
time-consistent beliefs in a way that is consistent with
the economic principle of maximization. As a result, we
gain new insights regarding preference for commitment
and time-inconsistent beliefs and preferences.
Now, we turn our attention to how the optimal
subjective beliefs are determined. As explained in
§1.2, since an individual’s current utility depends on
his expectations about the course of the future, more
optimistic beliefs about the future make him happier
in the present. But such beliefs come at a cost: they
sacrifice the benefits of smoothing work over time, since
an individual who believes that a task is unrealistically
easy to complete exerts less work in period 1 and ends
up working more in period 2. So there is a trade-off
between optimism, which raises anticipatory utility,
and objectivity, which allows for better smoothing of
work over time. To capture this trade-off, similar to
Landier (2000) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005),
we define a welfare function, which we refer to as the
individual’s well-being W, as the objective expected
discounted sum of utility over states and time. Optimal
beliefs maximize W, given that the individual makes
optimal decisions based on these beliefs.
Definition. Optimal beliefs are characterized by
the sequence 8ˆt9t∈T of subjective beliefs for each t ∈ T
that maximizes well-being
W 2= Ɛ
[∑
≥0
U
]
1 (4)
where actions are optimally chosen given beliefs and
subject to resource constraints.
In our setup, quadratic utility implies that only the
mean and variance of  matter, so subjective beliefs
at time t are determined by the subjective mean and
variance; this greatly reduces the complexity of solving
for optimal beliefs. In addition, since the only random
variable in our model is , we simplify notation by
defining its subjective mean and variance at time t as
Eˆt 2= Ɛˆt67 and èˆt 2= Ɛˆt627− 4Ɛˆt6752, and we use the
explicit form Ɛˆt67 only when stating results.
We choose the welfare function in Equation (4) for
the following reasons. First, as argued in Caplin and
Leahy (2000), with anticipatory utility it is natural to
consider a welfare function that involves the (weighted)
sum of utility from all sources, rather than just con-
sumption utility, over time. In fact, in a deterministic
setting, W collapses to an example of the social welfare
function proposed by Caplin and Leahy (2004). Second,
comparing V0 = Ɛˆ06
∑
≥0 U 7 with W= Ɛ6
∑
≥0 U 7,
we see that this choice of W has the nice property
that V0 and W are the same, except that the former is
evaluated at time 0 subjective beliefs and the latter is
evaluated at objective beliefs. Indeed, we use objective
expectations to evaluate well-being, because we are
interested in capturing the trade-off between distorting
beliefs and distorting actions across realizations of
uncertainty; objective expectations capture this since
uncertainty unfolds according to objective rather than
subjective probabilities.
Although our objective function for beliefs captures
the central trade-off of interest parsimoniously, other
candidates could also be considered. An alternative that
is close to—but computationally more complex than—
what we do is to consider that optimal beliefs at time t
maximize well-being from the perspective at time t;
i.e., for each t ∈ T , optimal beliefs at time t maximize
Wt 2= Ɛt6
∑
≥t −tU 7. The same trade-off would exist
between optimism, which raises anticipatory utility,
and objectivity, which allows better smoothing, so
our main results would hold. An alternative that is
conceptually farther from what we do is to consider
that the objective for beliefs is evaluated at subjective
beliefs. In this case, completely optimistic beliefs would
be trivially optimal, so the model would not capture
the trade-off of interest unless it incorporated explicit
costs of belief distortion.13
13 Modeling explicit psychological costs of belief distortion requires
a theory of the internal process through which this distortion is
achieved. This not only falls more into the scope of the psychology
literature but also complicates the analysis without providing much
economic insight. We note, however, that introducing a simplistic
yet sensible explicit cost of belief distortion—a quadratic cost in
the period in which the distortion occurs—should not affect our
qualitative results; see §B.3 in the online appendix for a formal proof
showing that our main results on optimism and the planning fallacy
still hold.
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In terms of interpretation, beliefs may be formed
unconsciously or partly consciously. Our model cap-
tures an optimal balancing of the benefits of unrealistic
optimism against the average costs of the poor behavior
that they induce, rather than any particular mechanism
through which this is accomplished. An example of one
possible mechanism is that people have an inherent
optimistic bias that they choose to discipline with
attention and more realistic thinking when they see
potentially costly outcomes. Alternatively, beliefs could
be formed through an automatic process, which is the
result, e.g., of evolutionary forces.14
2. Optimism and Overconfidence
In this section, we present results for the case without
access to a commitment device. First, we show that
optimism and overconfidence maximize well-being,
and hence they are optimal; as a result, people exhibit
the planning fallacy in planning situations. Second, it
is optimal for an individual to become less optimistic
as the temporal distance to the task decreases.
Given some arbitrary subjective beliefs, the indi-
vidual chooses work w1 at time 1 to maximize the
subjective expected present-discounted value of cur-
rent and future utility, V1 = Ɛˆ16U1 +U27, subject to
the constraint w1 ≤ 1 and to the resource constraint
w1 +w2 = 1 +.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Work Given Arbitrary
Beliefs). With arbitrary subjective expectations Ɛˆ0, Ɛˆ1, at
t = 1 the agent chooses action
w∗148Ɛˆt95 2= min811B141 + Ɛˆ167591 (5)
with B1 2= 4+5/41 ++5.15 With rational expectations,
wRE1 2=w∗14Ɛ5= min811B141 + Ɛ6759.
14 Veenhoven (2008) surveys the evidence from more than 30 studies
on the effects of happiness on longevity and shows that happy
people live on average a decade longer than unhappy people. He
also cites evidence that happiness has a much stronger effect on later
health than prior health does on later happiness. So holding beliefs
that maximize the discounted sum of objective expected utility over
time may maximize health, and therefore may become an instinct as
a result of natural selection. We also note that, although market
selection could lead to some attrition of agents with optimal (and
presumably incorrect) beliefs, agents with optimal beliefs would still
survive, not only because all agents hold optimal beliefs of varying
degrees according to our theory but also because holding these
beliefs may grant advantages, e.g., in terms of overall health through
happiness, as already mentioned, or in terms of riskier actions and
hence higher expected returns (see the literatures on the survival
of noise traders and on chief executive officer overconfidence for
related arguments).
15 The notation w∗148Ɛˆt95 makes it clear that this is optimal work
given arbitrary expectations Ɛˆt for t ∈ T . Subsequently, we omit the
argument, unless we want to refer to optimal work given some
specific beliefs.
To interpret this result, we make the following obser-
vations. First, by certainty equivalence, only the mean
of  matters for behavior. Second, because utility is
concave, the agent wants to smooth work across peri-
ods. Finally, in a standard model, the agent smooths
work by choosing w1 to be a fraction of expected total
work using objective beliefs; in our model he uses
subjective beliefs.
Our first main result is that, from the perspective of
well-being maximization, optimism and the planning
fallacy are optimal, whereas rational expectations are
suboptimal. In what follows, the superscript ND indi-
cates optimal beliefs and corresponding decisions in
the no-deadline case, and the superscript RE indicates
optimal decisions under rational expectations.
Proposition 2 (Optimism and the Planning Fal-
lacy Are Optimal). (i) Optimal expectations are charac-
terized by ƐˆND0 67= 0 and ƐˆND1 67, a piecewise linear, weakly
increasing function of Ɛ67.16
(ii) Optimal beliefs are optimistic; i.e., ƐˆND0 67 < Ɛ67
and ƐˆND1 67 < Ɛ67.
(iii) Over time, beliefs become less optimistic; i.e.,
ƐˆND0 67≤ ƐˆND1 67.
(iv) The planning fallacy (underestimation of task dura-
tion) is optimal; i.e., ƐˆND0 6w
∗
1 + w∗27 < Ɛ6w∗1 + w∗27 and
ƐˆND1 6w
∗
1 +w∗27 < Ɛ6w∗1 +w∗27.
(v) The optimal work iswND1 2=w∗148ƐˆNDt 95=B141+ƐˆND1 675
≤wRE1 .
The results of this proposition are illustrated in
Figure 3.
So, according to our theory, people at a subconscious
level know the objective distribution, but it is optimal
to be optimistic; hence they underestimate the amount
of work that the project requires and do less work
at time 1 than they would have chosen to do if they
held objective beliefs. This description of the planning
fallacy is similar to its original description (Kahneman
and Tversky 1982; see the quote in introduction). To
understand why optimism is optimal, we consider its
benefits and costs. Optimism has anticipatory benefits
for time 0 utility and real and anticipatory benefits
for time 1 utility but an average cost as a result of
suboptimal smoothing for time 2 utility. Optimal beliefs
are optimistic, because anticipatory benefits are first
order, whereas behavioral costs are second order.17
16 We note that the extreme result ƐˆND0 67 = 0 follows from the
standard assumption that the agent does not care about the past
and from our simplifying assumption of no explicit costs of belief
distortion. The expression for ƐˆND1 67 is given in the appendix.
17 We note that our theory is not incompatible with evidence of
pessimism related to tail-risk events, e.g., high demand for insurance
policies with low deductible and low demand for annuities (often
explained as due to people overweighting the probability of unlikely
events). Although building our model of optimal beliefs on top of
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Figure 3 (Color online) Optimism and the Planning Fallacy Are Optimal
0
(a)  Optimal expectations
1– – 1
B1
E
NDE1
NDE0
EU
NDL
ND
(b)  Optimal action
0
1
B1
1
RE
1
ND
EU
NDL
ND 1– – 1
B1
Notes. In panel (a), the solid 45 line plots the rational expectation E , the dashed line plots the optimal expectation EˆND0 at t = 0, and the dotted line plots the
optimal expectation EˆND1 at t = 1, all as functions of E , the objective mean of . In panel (b), the dashed line plots the optimal work wRE1 given rational expectations,
and the dotted line plots the optimal work wND1 given optimal beliefs absent a commitment device, both as functions of E . The constraint Eˆ
ND
0 ≥ 0 binds everywhere,
and the constraint EˆND1 ≥ 0 binds below NDL , whereas the constraints wRE1 ≤ 1 and wND1 ≤ 1 bind above 1/B1 and above NDU , respectively. All constants are defined
in the appendix.
Our model predicts that the greater the optimism
and the planning fallacy, the greater the anticipatory
benefits of optimism and the smaller the ex post costs
of misplanning. Although we defer to §4 on com-
parative statics for a discussion of the effect of the
conventional discount factor  and the anticipatory
discount factor  on optimal beliefs, Figure 3 shows
that optimal expectations are an increasing piecewise
linear function of the objective expectation E. Optimal
expectations are increasing in E, because the cost of
belief distortion resulting from suboptimal smoothing
increases in E; linearity follows from quadratic utility,
and the constant segments are due to the constraints
w1 ≤ 1 and Eˆt ≥ 0 for all t.
Our theory also predicts that beliefs become less
optimistic over time. From Proposition 1, we know that
optimal work w∗1 given arbitrary subjective beliefs is a
fraction, B1, of time 1 expected total work. Beliefs at
t = 0 do not matter at t = 1 and hence do not determine
w∗1 . As a result, although optimistic deviations of time 0
and time 1 subjective beliefs from objective beliefs both
yield anticipatory benefits since they both imply a
reduction in anticipated total work, the former induces
no distortionary costs on work smoothing, whereas the
latter does. Consequently, time 0 optimal beliefs are
more optimistic than time 1 optimal beliefs.
Our second main result is that people are overconfi-
dent about their predictions.
Proposition 3 (Overconfidence Is Optimal).
(i) From objective beliefs, a small decrease in the perceived
uncertainty about future work increases the agent’s well-
being: d /dˆ0ˆ t= t < 0 and d /dˆ1ˆ t= t < 0.
rational preferences does not predict this pessimism, building it on
top of, e.g., prospect theory preferences that incorporate probability
weighting would yield agents who are optimistic over most events
and pessimistic over tail events.
(ii) The agent’s well-being is maximized by the belief that
he knows what work level will be required: ˆND0 = ˆND1 =
0<.
Certainty equivalence implies that overconfidence
has no behavioral consequences, but since utility is
concave, it does have anticipatory benefits. Thus, the
optimal subjective uncertainty is the corner solution
of certainty. Our result is extreme because utility is
quadratic and there is no explicit cost to distorting
beliefs, but some overconfidence is optimal for a wider
range of utility functions.18 Yet even in its extremity,
our prediction again closely matches the initial psy-
chological interpretation of the planning fallacy by
Kahneman and Tversky (1982, p. 415) that people focus
on a single plausible scenario for completing the task
and ignore uncertainty:
The planning fallacy is a consequence of the tendency
to neglect distributional data and to adopt what may be
termed an internal approach to prediction, in which
one focuses on the constituents of the specific problem
rather than on the distribution of outcomes in similar
cases.
We note that although, in theory, a reduction in the
subjective variance is distinct from a reduction in the
subjective mean, in practice, experimental evidence
sometimes blurs this difference. The bias in mean
explains both main experimental findings: (i) overcon-
fidence about how often the task will be completed
by the predicted time and (ii) underestimation of the
18 In general, sufficient curvature in utility relative to marginal utility
is needed. The more curved utility is, the larger the direct increase in
well-being for a reduction in variance. The less curved marginal
utility is, the smaller the behavioral response to the decrease in
uncertainty, from the precautionary channel, so the smaller the
indirect decrease in well-being from changed behavior.
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task completion time on average. The bias in variance
makes overconfidence more extreme. In any case, our
model delivers both biases.
3. Preference for Commitment
We now examine optimal behavior and beliefs in the
presence of a commitment device—in particular, a
deadline that may be self-imposed. Our theory predicts
that people optimally self-impose constraints, which
improve the intertemporal smoothing of work but do
not implement perfect smoothing. The novelty of our
results relative to extant economic theories of preference
for commitment is twofold. First, the desire for commit-
ment arises from changing beliefs over time rather than
from changing preferences. Second, we do not assume
that preferences or beliefs are present biased; rather, we
show conditions under which commitment is optimal
and beliefs are time inconsistent and become more
optimistic over time. Thus, our theory also provides
predictions for beliefs and behavior that differ from
those of a preference-based theory; we defer to §6
a detailed comparison of the predictions of the two
theories.
We explain the intuition behind our results on self-
imposed deadlines, and we present them formally
in Proposition 4. Then in Proposition 5, we contrast
the optimal self-imposed deadline with the deadline
that an external observer with objective beliefs would
choose or, equivalently, the deadline that maximizes
well-being.
Given some arbitrary subjective beliefs, at t = 0 the
agent wants to maximize the time 0 subjective expected
present-discounted value of current and future utility,
V0 = Ɛˆ06U0 +U1 +2U27. From his time 0 perspective,
the optimal amount of work at time 1 is
w∗101 48Ɛˆt95 2= min811D041+ Ɛˆ0675+D141+ Ɛˆ167591 (6)
where D0 2= 42 +25/4++2 +2 +5, D1 2=
/4++2 +2 +5. This amount of work is
different from what the agent will in fact choose at
time 1, which is w∗148Ɛˆt95= min811B141 + Ɛˆ16759 (see
Proposition 1). This is because, from the agent’s time 0
perspective, time 0 beliefs as well as time 1 beliefs
matter, so w∗101 is a fraction of time 0 expected total
work plus a fraction of time 1 expected total work.
The agent prefers commitment at period 0 and
chooses the binding deadline  =w∗101 if he believes
that he will subsequently choose to work too little
at period 1; i.e., w∗1 <w
∗10
1 . Comparing Equations (5)
and (6), this means that the agent chooses a binding
deadline only if subjective beliefs satisfy Eˆ0 > Eˆ1; i.e.,
they become more optimistic over time.19 The agent
19 In detail, w∗101 >w
∗
1 ⇔D041 + Eˆ05 > 4B1 −D1541 + Eˆ15, and we can
show D0 <B1 −D1.
may or may not consciously understand that becom-
ing more optimistic is the cause of suboptimal work
smoothing. Nevertheless, it is this time inconsistency,
and the agent’s awareness of the resulting behavior,
that leads to his willingness to overcome it by setting a
binding deadline for himself.
If a deadline is chosen, optimal beliefs are different
from what they would be without a commitment device.
Time 0 beliefs are more pessimistic because, with a
deadline, an optimistic distortion of time 0 beliefs has
the same anticipatory benefit as without a deadline
but a higher distortionary cost, since it distorts the
optimal deadline more than it distorts the optimal
work without a deadline. By contrast, time 1 beliefs are
more optimistic because, with a deadline, an optimistic
distortion of time 1 beliefs has the same anticipatory
benefit as without a deadline but a lower distortionary
cost, since it distorts the optimal deadline less than
it distorts the optimal work without a deadline. To
see all this, compare Equations (5) and (6), noting that
D1 <B1 and D0 > 0.
Finally, we need to understand for what parameter
values (, , and E) commitment is optimal. We have
already explained that commitment leads to better
smoothing of work and that the associated beliefs lead
to lower anticipatory utility in period 0 but higher
anticipatory utility in period 1. In addition, the higher
the conventional discount factor , the higher the cost of
suboptimal smoothing, and the smaller the anticipatory
discount factor , the more important the period 1
anticipatory utility relative to the period 0 anticipatory
utility in terms of the well-being. Thus, the higher  is
relative to , the higher is the value of commitment
and hence the more likely it is to be optimal. We show
that there is a cutoff ¯45, increasing in the anticipatory
discount factor , such that a binding deadline may be
optimally chosen if and only if > ¯45.20 Furthermore,
a binding deadline is more likely to be optimally chosen
(the difference in well-being W with and without a
deadline is greatest) for intermediate values of the
objective mean E. In principle, the benefit from the
improved work smoothing that a deadline implements
should be minimal when expected total work is small
(E is small) and maximal when it is large (E is large).
However, because of the constraint w1 ≤ 1, there is no
such benefit when expected total work is large enough
that the optimal amount of work w∗1 without a deadline
equals 1; hence, the benefit is maximal for intermediate
values of the objective mean E.
The following proposition states formally these
results and provides the expression for the optimal self-
imposed deadline. The superscript D indicates optimal
quantities in the case of a self-imposed deadline.
20 We note that ¯45 is close to 2. Keeping this in mind, one can see
in Figure 2 the plots of the compound discount factors for which an
optimal deadline will be chosen for some values of E.
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Figure 4 (Color online) Optimal Expectations and the Optimal Deadline, in the Case of a Self-Imposed Deadline
E
E0D
E1D B1
1
D
1
ND
0
(a)  Optimal expectations
EID UD UND
(b)  Optimal action
ELNDL′
D 0 ID UDL′
D
(1 + UD) –1s0D–
(1 + ID) –1s0D
(1 + UD) –1s1D
(B1 – D1)/D0 – 1
+ D1
–
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/– –D0s0 s0D D
Notes. In panel (a), the solid 45 line plots the rational expectation E , the dashed line plots the optimal expectation EˆD0 at t = 0, and the dotted line plots the
optimal expectation EˆD1 at t = 1, all as functions of E , the objective mean of . In panel (b), the dashed line plots the optimal deadline D, and the dotted line plots
the optimal work wND1 given optimal beliefs absent a commitment device, both as functions of E . In both panels, the shaded region indicates the values of E for
which the binding deadline is optimally chosen. The constraints Eˆ0 ≥ 0 and Eˆ1 ≥ 0 bind below DL′ and DI , respectively, and the constraint  ≤ 1 binds above DU . All
constants are defined in the appendix.
Proposition 4 (Self-Imposed Deadline). (i) If the
degree to which the agent cares about his future selves is
small relative to the degree to which he gains immediate
utility from anticipating future consumption (≤ ¯),
or the objective expectation of work is outside a certain
range (Ɛ ∈M), optimal beliefs are identical to those
absent a commitment device, and the agent does not impose
a binding deadline.21
(ii) If the degree to which the agent cares about his
future selves is large relative to the degree to which he
gains immediate utility from anticipating future consump-
tion (> ¯), and the objective expectation of work is
intermediate (Ɛ ∈M), then we have the following:
• Optimal expectations ƐˆD0  and Ɛˆ
D
1  are weakly
increasing functions of Ɛ.
• Optimal beliefs are optimistic (ƐˆD0  < Ɛ and
ƐˆD1  < Ɛ).
• Optimal beliefs become more optimistic over time
(ƐˆD0 ≥ ƐˆD1 ).
• Time 0 optimal beliefs are more pessimistic (ƐˆD0 ≥
ƐˆND0 ), and time 1 optimal beliefs more optimistic (Ɛˆ
D
1 ≤
ƐˆND1 ) than absent a commitment device.
• The optimal deadline D =D01+ ƐˆD0 +D11+
ƐˆD1  binds (w
∗
1Ɛˆ
D
t ≤ D) but is smaller than wRE1 .
• Complete overconfidence is optimal (ˆD0 = ˆD1 = 0<).
Figure 4 plots the optimal expectations that imple-
ment a binding deadline (panel (a)) and the optimal
21 In the proof of this proposition in §A.4 of the appendix, we provide
expressions for the optimal beliefs as well as the cutoff ¯ and the
set M. We note here that ¯ is increasing in  and that M is a
convex set of the form , i.e., there is a cutoff value 
above which a binding deadline is optimally chosen, except for
values of  and  near the region where M switches from being
empty to being nonempty. Also, using a very fine grid of values for
, , and E, we can show numerically that M1⊂M2 for
1 <2 and M1⊃M2 for 1 <2.
deadline versus the optimal work absent a commitment
device (panel (b)).
Next, we contrast the optimal self-imposed deadline
with the deadline that an external observer with objec-
tive beliefs would choose or, equivalently, the deadline
that maximizes well-being. That is, we contrast the
self-imposed deadline that the agent himself chooses
at period 0 to maximize the subjectively expected
discounted sum of utility, Ɛˆ0
∑
≥0 U, with the exter-
nally imposed deadline that an objective external
observer chooses at period 0 to maximize the objec-
tively expected discounted sum of the agent’s utility,
including (subjective) anticipatory utility, Ɛ
∑
≥0 U,
which is also the well-being. In what follows, the
superscript ED indicates optimal quantities in the case
of an externally imposed deadline.
Proposition 5 (Externally Imposed Deadline).
(i) Optimal beliefs are optimistic (ƐˆED0  < Ɛ and
ƐˆED1  < Ɛ).
(ii) Optimal beliefs become more pessimistic over time
(ƐˆED0 ≤ ƐˆED1 ).
(iii) Optimal beliefs are more optimistic (ƐˆED0 ≤ ƐˆD0 
and ƐˆED1 ≤ ƐˆD1 ) than with a self-imposed deadline.
(iv) The optimal deadline ED =min1D01+ Ɛ+
D11+ ƐˆED1  binds (w∗1ƐˆEDt ≤ ED) and is stricter
than a self-imposed deadline (D ≤ ED) but smaller
than wRE1 .
The deadline chosen by an outsider with ratio-
nal beliefs (equivalently, the deadline that maximizes
well-being) is stricter than the self-imposed one. The
reason is that the rational outsider chooses the dead-
line using rational rather than the more optimistic
subjective beliefs; hence he expects that more total
work is required. But this externally imposed deadline
requires less work than the optimal amount of work
wRE1 that the agent himself would choose at time 1 if he
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had rational expectations. This is because, though the
rational outsider maximizes the objectively expected
discounted sum of the agent’s utility, we can see from
Equation (3) that utility itself is evaluated using the
agent’s optimistic subjective beliefs; hence the optimal
amount of smoothing is different than if the agent
had rational beliefs. In fact, optimal beliefs with an
externally imposed deadline are even more optimistic
than with a self-imposed one, since (i) optimistic time 0
beliefs have no distortionary cost, because they do
not affect the externally imposed deadline and hence
intertemporal smoothing; and (ii) optimistic time 1
beliefs have a smaller distortionary cost as a result of
suboptimal smoothing, because the externally imposed
deadline is stricter.22
4. Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine how optimal beliefs and
optimal decisions vary with the structural parame-
ters of our model, the conventional discount factor ,
which captures the degree to which an agent cares
about his future selves, and the anticipatory discount
factor , which captures the degree to which an agent
gains immediate utility from anticipating future con-
sumption. These comparative statics serve to further
our understanding of what drives optimal beliefs and
behavior in our model and to contrast our theory with
that of present-biased preferences for which we also
derive comparative statics in §5.2. This comparison is
theoretically interesting, and it could also be empiri-
cally interesting if it could form the basis of tests to
evaluate the two theories. However, the use of these
comparative statics in empirical tests is challenging
because it involves the estimation of individuals’ time
preference parameters; although there is a literature on
the estimation of the conventional discount factor ,
we are not aware of any research on the estimation of
the anticipatory discount factor .
Our results here are that (i) optimal beliefs with
(without) a commitment device become less (more)
optimistic as the conventional discount factor  (the
anticipatory discount factor ) increases, (ii) the optimal
work wND1 without a commitment device increases (first
decreases, then increases) as  () increases, and (iii) the
optimal deadline D increases (decreases) as  ()
increases.23
Proposition 6 (Comparative Statics Without a
Commitment Device). (i) Optimal time 1 beliefs become
22 That is, optimistic time 1 beliefs lead to higher w2 than is rationally
optimal. But with a stricter deadline, w1 is larger and w2 is smaller,
so since u is concave, suboptimal smoothing is less costly.
23 In all comparative statics, we focus on intermediate values of E
such that the constraints w1 ≤ 1 and Eˆt ≥ 0 do not bind; i.e., optimal
beliefs and work are interior rather than corner solutions.
less optimistic and optimal work wND1 increases as agents
care more about their future selves: dEˆND1 /d > 0 and
dwND1 /d> 0.
(ii) Optimal time 1 beliefs become more optimistic as
agents get more utility from anticipation: dEˆND1 /d< 0.
Optimal work wND1 first decreases and then increases as
 increases: for ≤, dwND1 /d< 0; for <≤ ¯45,
dwND1 /d> 0 for small Ɛ67 and dw
ND
1 /d< 0 for large
Ɛ67; and for ¯45 <, dwND1 /d> 0.
24
Time 0 beliefs are completely optimistic, so we have
no interesting comparative statics for them.
Proposition 7 (Comparative Statics with a Self-
Imposed Deadline). If the commitment device is used (i.e.,
a binding deadline is optimally chosen), then we have the
following:
(i) Optimal time 0 and time 1 beliefs become less opti-
mistic and the optimal deadline D increases as agents care
more about their future selves: dEˆD0 /d> 0, dEˆ
D
1 /d> 0,
and dD/d> 0.
(ii) Optimal time 0 and time 1 beliefs become more
optimistic and the optimal deadline D decreases as agents
get more utility from anticipation: dEˆD0 /d< 0, dEˆ
D
1 /d<
0, and dD/d< 0.
To interpret the results of the preceding propositions,
we remember that optimal beliefs are optimistic and
are associated with a benefit from anticipatory utility
and a cost from suboptimal smoothing. The benefit
from holding optimistic beliefs comes from anticipatory
utility, which is discounted by ; so the less antici-
pated utility is discounted (the higher  is), the more
optimistic are the optimal beliefs (so dEˆ0/d< 0 and
dEˆ1/d< 0). On the other hand, most of the cost from
suboptimal smoothing comes from lowered utility in
period 2, where the disutility of having to work more
in period 2 is actually experienced; so the less future
utility is discounted (the higher  is), the less optimistic
are the optimal beliefs (so dEˆ0/d> 0 and dEˆ1/d> 0).
The effect of the conventional and of the anticipatory
discount factor on optimal actions is both direct and
indirect. We see from Proposition 2 that for the optimal
work without a deadline, wND1 , there is a direct effect
through the proportion, B1, of expected total work
that is optimally done in period 1 and an indirect
effect through time 1 expectations. For given beliefs, a
higher conventional discount factor  means that the
agent cares more about his future selves, so the future
utility from all sources is discounted less, and a higher
anticipatory discount factor  means that he savors
future anticipated consumption more, so anticipatory
utility is discounted less. Thus with higher  and , the
agent cares more about consumption utility at time 2;
therefore the direct effect is that it is optimal to perform
24 The definition of ¯45 is given in the appendix.
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a higher proportion of expected total work at time 1
(wND1 is higher). Since the optimal amount of work at
time 1, wND1 , is increasing in the expected total work,
which in turn is increasing in  and decreasing in , as
was explained above, the indirect effect on wND1 through
beliefs is positive for  and negative for . Clearly, then,
the overall effect of a higher conventional discount
factor  on wND1 is positive, whereas the overall effect
of a higher anticipatory discount factor  is ambiguous.
The indirect effect dominates; hence, wND1 decreases
with , for  small relative to , whereas the reverse
is true for  large relative to . The effect of  and
 on the optimal deadline, D, is similar to that on
optimal work without a deadline, wND1 , except that
for , we have the unambiguous result dD/d< 0,
because a binding deadline is only chosen for high
values of  relative to  ( > ¯45 > ), where the
negative indirect effect through beliefs dominates.
5. A Model with Present-Biased
Preferences
In this section, we develop the counterpart of our
model in the planning context, under the assumption
of rational beliefs and present-biased preferences. We
follow Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997)
in assuming that this present bias takes the form
of quasihyperbolic discounting. In §5.1 we present
the model and the optimal decisions—the work and
deadline choice—and in §5.2 we present comparative
statics of the optimal decisions with respect to the
discount factors.
5.1. Optimal Actions with Present-Biased
Preferences
For the model with quasihyperbolic discounting, we
assume beliefs are objective and that the discounted
terms in U and V are all multiplied by the present
bias parameter 0 ≤  ≤ 1, which creates a present-bias
effect. So Equations (2) and (3) become
Vt 2= Ɛt
[
Ut + 
∑
>t
−tU
]
1 (7)
Ut 2= Ɛt
[
u4wt5+ 
∑
>t
−tu4w5
]
1 (8)
where, as was explained in §1.2,  is the conventional
discount factor that captures the degree to which an
individual cares about his future selves, and  is the
anticipatory discount factor that captures the degree
to which he gains immediate utility from anticipating
future consumption. Although models in the litera-
ture on quasihyperbolic discounting do not consider
anticipatory utility, we incorporate it here to make
the comparison with our model of time-inconsistent
beliefs more direct. But setting the anticipatory discount
factor  to 0 to eliminate anticipatory utility does not
affect any of our qualitative results below (except those
involving variations in ).
The following proposition determines the optimal
decisions in the presence of present bias.
Proposition 8 (Optimal Decisions with Rational
Beliefs and Quasihyperbolic Discounting). (i) The
optimal work is wH1 2= min811 B˜41 + Ɛ6759, where B˜ 2=
4+5/41 + 4+55.
(ii) The optimal deadline is H 2= min811 D˜41 + Ɛ6759,
where D˜ 2= 4+2 +25/4+2 +2 ++5.
(iii) If  < ¯415 2= 42 +25/42 +2 +5, dead-
line H is chosen for all Ɛ67; otherwise, it is never chosen.
Proposition 8 on deadline choice with time-inconsistent
preferences contrasts Proposition 4 on deadline choice
with time-inconsistent beliefs. With time-inconsistent
preferences, the agent self-imposes a binding deadline at
time 0 either for all or for no values of the objectively
expected amount of total work, 1 + E. That is, irrespec-
tive of the amount of work expected, either the present
bias resulting from  dominates (when, for a given
11 and  are sufficiently similar, as explained below),
and hence the agent chooses a deadline, or the future
bias resulting from anticipatory utility dominates, and
hence the agent does not choose a deadline. With
time-inconsistent beliefs, on the other hand, the agent
self-imposes a binding deadline for some but not all
values of 1 +E, because optimal beliefs are optimistic
and the cost of suboptimal smoothing stemming from
optimistic beliefs increases with 1 +E. In addition, in
this case the agent is more likely to choose a binding
deadline at time 0, the larger the conventional discount
factor  is relative to the anticipatory discount factor 
(see §3 for the intuition).
The optimal work at time 1 from the time 1 perspec-
tive is wH1 , and the optimal deadline (equivalently, the
optimal work at time 1 from the time 0 perspective)
is H. Without anticipatory utility (= 0), we obtain the
usual result in models of quasihyperbolic discounting,
that the present bias introduced by  biases the time 1
optimal decision about work toward lower work wH1 .
25
As a result, the optimal work at time 1 is smaller from
the time 1 perspective than from the time 0 perspective,
and a sophisticated agent, i.e., one who knows and
correctly takes into account his preferences and beliefs
in the present and in the future, optimally chooses
a binding deadline at time 0. The agent exhibits this
preference for commitment for any amount of present
bias  < 1.
In the presence of anticipatory utility (0 <≤ 1),
 introduces an additional type of present bias, since it
tilts utility at time t toward consumption utility and
25 In our setting, the present bias has no effect on the time 0 optimal
decision about the deadline, H, because there is no consumption at
time 0.
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Figure 5 (Color online) Illustration of How, in a Model with Rational Beliefs and Quasihyperbolic Discounting, the Set of Values of the Conventional
Discount Factor  and the Anticipatory Discount Factor  for Which a Deadline Is Optimally Chosen Varies with Values of the Present-Bias
Parameter  in the Interval  23 1

1

1

1
0 1

 = 0.7
0 1

 = 0.8
0 1

 = 0.9(a) (b) (c)
Note. In each panel, the two straight lines plot the degenerate hyperbola  = ¯ on the – plane;  < ¯, and hence the deadline is chosen, in the
shaded area.
away from anticipatory utility from future consumption.
To see this clearly, we combine Equations (7) and (8)
to write
V0 = Ɛ
[
U0︸︷︷︸
uw1+2uw2
+ U1︸︷︷︸
uw1+uw2
+2 U2︸︷︷︸
uw2
]

V1 = Ɛ
[
U1︸︷︷︸
uw1+uw2
+ U2︸︷︷︸
uw2
]

(9)
We see that this additional type of present bias tilts
optimal decisions both at time 0 and at time 1 toward
lower work w1, but the effect is stronger for time 1,
because U1 is a bigger component of V1 than of V0; so
this additional type of present bias works in the same
direction as the usual type of present bias. With antici-
patory utility, the deadline is only optimally chosen for
a strong enough present bias ( < ¯) because, as
we have already explained in §1.2, introducing anticipa-
tory utility in the model introduces a future bias, and
the present bias introduced by  needs to be strong
enough ( needs to be small enough) to overcome it.
The amount of present bias necessary to induce this
preference for commitment depends on the values of
the conventional discount factor  and the anticipatory
discount factor . With a strong enough present bias
( ≤ 23 ), a binding deadline is chosen for all values
of ; otherwise, at each level of present bias  > 23 , it
is only chosen if the anticipatory discount factor  is
sufficiently small relative to the conventional discount
factor , or vice versa. This is because the future bias
introduced by anticipatory utility tilts optimal decisions
both at time 0 and at time 1 toward higher work w1,
and the effect is stronger for time 1 but less so if  is
small relative to  (or vice versa); as a result, in this
case a small amount of present bias resulting from
 < 1 is sufficient to overcome the distortion in optimal
decisions caused by the future bias. Figure 5 shows
the set of values for  and  for which a deadline is
chosen for a range of values  > 23 .
5.2. Comparative Statics with Present-Biased
Preferences
Here, we present comparative statics in the model with
rational beliefs and quasihyperbolic discounting. In
short, (i) the optimal work wH1 increases both with the
conventional discount factor  and with the anticipatory
discount factor , which contrasts our earlier result that
the optimal work wND1 with optimal beliefs increases
(first decreases and then increases) as  () increases;
and (ii) the optimal deadline H increases (decreases)
with  and  if  is large (small), which contrasts our
earlier result that the optimal deadline D with optimal
beliefs increases (decreases) with  ().
Proposition 9 (Comparative Statics with Ratio-
nal Beliefs and Quasihyperbolic Discounting).
(i) If present bias is weak enough ( ≥ ¯)
such that a deadline is not chosen at t= 0, the opti-
mal work wH1 increases with the conventional dis-
count factor  and the anticipatory discount factor :
dwH1 /d≥ 0, dwH1 /d≥ 0
(ii) If present bias is strong enough ( < ¯)
such that a deadline is chosen at t = 0, the optimal
deadline H
• increases (decreases) as —the degree to which
agents care about their future selves—increases, if  is large
(small): dH/d> 0⇔  > 2 − 2−2/2, or
• increases (decreases) as —the degree to which
agents get utility from anticipation—increases, if  is large
(small): dH/d> 0⇔  > 2 − 2−2/2.
To interpret these results, we refer to Equation (9).
For weak present bias ( ≥ ¯), the agent at time 0 does
not choose a deadline, so the agent at time 1 chooses
the optimal work to maximize V1, the subjectively
expected discounted sum of utility from time 1 onward.
At time 1, the agent discounts future consumption
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utility, u4w25, by factor  because he gains immediate
utility from anticipation and by factor  because he
cares about his future self. This future consumption
utility is increasing in the amount of work at time 1, so
the higher the conventional discount factor , and the
higher the anticipatory discount factor , the higher
the optimal work w1.
For strong present bias ( < ¯), the agent at time 0
self-imposes the deadline H that maximizes V0, the
subjectively expected discounted sum of utility from
time 0 onward. Without anticipatory utility (= 0), the
higher the conventional discount factor , the higher
the optimal deadline. This is simply because, in this
case, the present bias introduced by  has no effect on
the optimal decision at time 0 about the deadline, and
since an agent with a higher  cares more about his
future selves, he will impose a higher deadline so he
will need to work less in the future. With anticipatory
utility (> 0), the conventional and the anticipatory
discount factors  and  have an ambiguous effect on
the optimal deadline H.26
6. Summary of Theoretical Implications
and Relevant Evidence
With a view toward empirical testing, in this section we
summarize the implications of our theory of optimal
time-inconsistent beliefs and contrast them with those
from models with present-biased preferences. We relate
some of these implications to existing experiments
from the psychology literature on the planning fallacy,
and we argue that our theory is mostly consistent
with the existing evidence on beliefs and behavior,
whereas a model with present-biased preferences is
only consistent with a fraction of the evidence. We
note that although we cannot always map our theo-
retical setup precisely to the experimental setup of
existing studies, it is usually possible to accommodate
differences through reinterpretation or through straight-
forward extensions of our model; we point these out,
wherever relevant, in our subsequent discussion. All
the predictions and relevant evidence discussed below
are succinctly presented in Table 1.
26 For a strong enough present bias (small enough ), utility at time 1,
U1, is tilted sufficiently toward consumption utility from work at
time 1 and away from anticipatory utility from work at time 2.
Therefore a higher conventional discount factor  has a first-order
effect on how much the agent at time 0 cares about consumption
utility at time 1 and only a second-order effect on how much he cares
about consumption utility at time 2; so if  is also small, increasing it
has an overall negative effect on the optimal deadline. If present bias
is weaker ( is larger) or the conventional discount factor  is larger,
the opposite is true. The effect of the anticipatory discount factor 
on the optimal deadline, H, is also ambiguous. For a strong enough
present bias (small enough ), anticipatory utility from work at
time 1 is sufficiently more important than that from work at time 2;
hence the less anticipatory utility is discounted (the higher  is), the
smaller the optimal deadline H; the opposite is true if present bias
is not strong enough.
6.1. Beliefs—Implications
First, we consider implications regarding beliefs. In
our setup, the amount of work or time necessary to
complete the task is 1 +  (or w1 +w2). According
to Propositions 2–4, our model predicts that beliefs
are optimistic and overconfident. It also predicts that
beliefs become more pessimistic over time if a deadline
is not chosen and more optimistic if a deadline is
chosen. According to Proposition 5, our model predicts
that beliefs are more optimistic with an externally
imposed rather than with a self-imposed deadline.
From Proposition 6, our model predicts that individuals
with higher conventional discount factor  (higher
anticipatory discount factor ) hold more pessimistic
(more optimistic) beliefs.
Finally, it is straightforward to extend our model to
incorporate various incentives, which are sometimes
used in experimental settings; we do so for two situa-
tions in §B.3 of the online appendix. First, we consider
an incentive for the speed of task completion, modeled
as a payment at time 2 that is decreasing in total work,
1 +. In this case, consumption utility is derived not
only from the disutility of work but also from the
subjective expected payment; the latter generates an
incentive to believe that the total amount of work
is low, so hence it is optimal to be even more opti-
mistic and suffer from the planning fallacy even more
than without the payment. Second, we consider an
incentive for the accuracy of task duration prediction,
modeled as a payment at t = 2 that is decreasing in the
(absolute) difference between objective and subjective
expectations about 1 +. Again, consumption utility is
derived not only from the disutility of work but also
from the payment, which acts as an additional, explicit,
cost of belief distortion; hence it is optimal to be less
optimistic and suffer from the planning fallacy less
than without the payment.27
These predictions stand in contrast to the model with
present-biased preferences in which beliefs are assumed
to be objective. That said, some models with present-
biased preferences also assume that beliefs about future
preferences are (exogenously) naïve or partially sophis-
ticated. And these models can match the evidence that
beliefs about task duration are optimistic, that they
become more pessimistic over time (without a deadline),
and that they are affected by an incentive for the speed
of task completion.28 What these models cannot match
is evidence on duration prediction for tasks in which
27 We note that all predictions mentioned in this paragraph have been
phrased in terms of beliefs about total work/time 1 +, but they can
also be phrased identically in terms of beliefs about work w2 in the
second period, or in terms of the planning fallacy.
28 For example, consider an individual who believes that a project
will take 20 hours of work and initially plans to complete it in 2 days,
working 10 hours a day. If he is naïve, he will not anticipate any
deviations from this plan, hence predicting that he will complete
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Table 1 (Color online) Predictions and Evidence
Optimal time-inconsistent beliefs Time-inconsistent preferences Evidence
Panel A: Beliefs about work/time needed for a task
Beliefs are rational/optimistic. Optimistic Rational Optimistic
Without a deadline, beliefs become more/less optimistic as the
temporal distance to the task decreases.
Less No effect Less
With a deadline, beliefs become more/less optimistic as the
temporal distance to the task decreases.
More No effect
Beliefs are more optimistic with an externally imposed deadline
than with a self-imposed deadline.
More No difference
Beliefs become more/less optimistic with a higher . Less No effect
Beliefs become more/less optimistic with a higher . More No effect
Effect of incentive for accuracy of prediction. Reduces optimism No effect Reduces optimism
Effect of incentive for speed of completion. Increases optimism No effect Increases optimism
Panel B: Optimal work (without a deadline)
Work smoothing is suboptimal. Yes Yes Yes (anecdotal)
w1 increases/decreases with . Increases Increases
w1 increases/decreases with . Decreases if <  Increases
Decreases if < < ¯
and E67 is large
Increases if ¯ < 
Effect of incentive for accuracy of prediction. Increases w1 No effect
Effect of incentive for speed of completion. Reduces w1 No effect
Panel C: Commitment
Individuals use commitment devices. Yes Yes, unless naïve Yes
Propensity for commitment depends on E67. Yes No, unless commitment is
costly
Propensity for commitment increases/decreases as  increases
relative to .
Increases Increases if > 
Decreases if < 
Optimal deadline increases/decreases with . Increases Decreases if  is small and 
is small relative to 
Increases if  is large or  is
large relative to 
Optimal deadline increases/decreases with . Decreases Decreases if  is small
Increases if  is large
External deadlines improve smoothing and performance
more than self-imposed ones.
Yes No, unless partially
sophisticated
Yes
Notes. Shown are predictions and relevant evidence for models with time-inconsistent beliefs and time-inconsistent preferences. Text in bold (italic) typeface
indicates predictions that are different (unless additional conditions hold, e.g., on partial sophistication or parameter values), and text in regular typeface indicates
predictions that are the same.
task duration is exogenous, as we describe subsequently.
Our model in which beliefs respond (endogenously)
to the anticipatory benefits and average ex post costs
matches evidence on duration underprediction, whereas
models with naïve or partially sophisticated agents
with present-biased preferences do not. Obviously, the
predictions of these different approaches will differ in
other environments as well.
6.2. Beliefs—Evidence
There is a wealth of robust experimental evi-
dence demonstrating that people underestimate task
the task in two days. But if he has time-inconsistent preferences,
he will, in fact, procrastinate and work, e.g., five hours a day for
four days. An experimenter would compare the initial prediction
with the time from the moment the task started to the moment it
ended and conclude that the individual held optimistic beliefs, even
though he held objective beliefs about the actual task duration. If
there was an incentive for speed, the individual would procrastinate
less; hence his beliefs would seem less optimistic.
completion time. Roy et al. (2005) survey 14 papers on
this planning fallacy and report that 12 papers find
that people hold optimistic beliefs about task duration
in all tasks studied, 1 paper finds optimistic beliefs
in some tasks, and 1 paper does not find optimistic
beliefs. For illustration purposes, one of the first studies
is by Buehler et al. (1994): individuals were asked to
predict the completion time for an academic task and a
nonacademic task they intended to complete in the
coming week, and subsequently, actual completion
times were collected. For academic (nonacademic) tasks,
the average predicted time was 508 (500) days, and the
actual completion time was 1007 (902) days, and only
37% (43%) of subjects completed the tasks in the pre-
dicted time, though 74% (70%) of them reported they
were certain they would do so. Although this evidence
is consistent with our model’s prediction of optimistic
and overconfident beliefs about actual task duration,
as we noted above, it can also be explained using a
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model with present-biased preferences, since actual task
duration is conflated with the time from the moment
the task starts to the moment that it ends. But other
studies on the planning fallacy allow us to distinguish
the two theories more effectively, since they involve
tasks with exogenous duration, for which duration
underprediction cannot be explained by procrastina-
tion in a model with time-inconsistent preferences.
For example, in Konecˇni and Ebbesen (1976), people
waiting in line at a gas station during the 1974 oil
crisis were asked to estimate how long they would
have to wait; the actual wait time was 29 minutes,
but the estimated wait time was only 19 minutes.29 In
this case, underprediction could be explained by the
anticipatory benefits of optimism but not by naïveté
regarding future preferences. 30
There is also some experimental evidence that is
consistent with our model’s prediction that beliefs
become less optimistic over time. In particular, Gilovich
et al. (1993) show that people’s average beliefs about
exam performance become less optimistic as temporal
distance from the exam decreases.31 This evidence
does not strongly distinguish our model from one
with present-biased preferences and partially sophisti-
cated (or naïve) agents, since it involves a task with
intervening events, but still it is reassuring. But more
generally, there is substantial evidence of non-Bayesian
belief updating, which our theory assumes is possible
and shows is optimal. A classic study on inconsistent
belief updating is the lawyer–engineer experiment by
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) that started the large
literature on the base rate fallacy. Also see Camerer
(1995) for a survey of other experimental evidence on
non-Bayesian updating.
Finally, we discuss evidence that is consistent with
our model’s prediction that beliefs about actual task
duration can be manipulated using monetary incentives
29 In the baseline interpretation of our setup, utility is derived from
working, but it could also be derived from waiting (as in this
experimental setup) or from any activity that affects one’s happiness.
30 Roy et al. (2005) survey six papers on the planning fallacy involving
tasks that lasted less than an hour. In four of six papers, subjects
exhibited the planning fallacy in all tasks, in one paper they exhibited
the planning fallacy in some tasks, and in one paper they did not
exhibit the planning fallacy. Taking into account that, as the authors
note, most studies involved manipulations aimed at reducing the
planning fallacy, this evidence is quite strong in favor of the planning
fallacy even for shorter tasks. We note that in these tasks there is no
room for suboptimal smoothing, so strictly speaking, our model
predicts complete optimism because it has no cost. Clearly, this is an
extreme result that follows from our focus on incentives, hence our
simplifying assumption that there are no explicit, e.g., psychological,
costs of belief distortion.
31 Although we do not talk explicitly about task performance in
our model setup, it is reasonable to assume that individuals with
optimistic beliefs about the total work necessary for the task are also
optimistic about their performance on the task, since they perceive it
to be shorter/easier.
that generate an anticipatory benefit or cost for opti-
mism. First, Byram (1997) and Buehler et al. (1997)
report the results of experiments in which subjects
are randomly assigned to a treatment giving them
payment for rapid completion of the task. In Byram
(1997), subjects in a treatment group were given explicit
incentives for rapid completion prior to making their
predictions for the duration of an origami folding task:
they were paid $4, $2, $1, or $0 for finishing in the first,
second, third, or fourth quartile, respectively, and the
control group was paid $3. For the control group, the
median prediction (actual) time was 7.8 (8.8) minutes;
for the treatment group, the median prediction (actual)
time was 5.0 (7.8) minutes. So the incentive for speed
raised the prediction error by 180% and decreased
the actual time to completion by 11%. Buehler et al.
(1997) study an experiment in which subjects complete
anagrams and, similar to Byram (1997), find that a
treatment group that is given incentives for speed
exhibits much greater bias in prediction and slightly
more rapid completion.
Second, Buehler et al. (1997) report the results of an
experiment involving the task of solving anagrams,
in which a treatment group is given a payment for
accurate prediction of task completion times. A ran-
dom subsample of subjects was given an incentive
for accuracy: $2 ($4) if the predicted completion time
was within 1 minute (30 seconds) of the actual time.
In addition, all subjects were given an incentive for
speed, as described previously; presumably, this was
done to discourage subjects from intentionally making
longer predictions and simply slowing down, if neces-
sary, to match them. For subjects without the incentive
for accurate prediction, the mean predicted (actual)
completion time was 401 (505) minutes, and for the
treatment group with the incentive for accurate pre-
diction, the mean predicted (actual) time was 508 (505)
minutes; hence optimism was eliminated, consistent
with our theory’s prediction.
6.3. Behavior—Implication
Now, we consider implications in terms of behavior.
According to Proposition 1, our model predicts that
work smoothing is suboptimal, and according to Propo-
sition 4, it predicts that individuals may use commit-
ment devices. Such behavior is, of course, also predicted
by models with present-biased preferences. According
to Proposition 5, our model predicts that externally
imposed deadlines are stricter, hence improving work
smoothing more than self-imposed deadlines; this is
also predicted by models with present-biased prefer-
ences, although only under the additional assumption
of partial sophistication. A prediction that is unique to
our model is that, since beliefs affect optimal actions,
incentives that affect optimal beliefs also affect optimal
actions that depend on these beliefs; this is not the case
in models with time-inconsistent preferences where
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beliefs are assumed to be rational. For example, we
have already discussed that an incentive for the speed
of task completion makes beliefs more optimistic and
an incentive for accurate predictions makes beliefs
more pessimistic. Therefore, our model predicts that
incentives for speed make the optimal work w1 in the
first period smaller and incentives for accuracy make
w1 larger. Finally, as we can see from Propositions 6, 7,
and 9, our model predicts that the optimal amount of
work w1 without a deadline, the optimal deadline ,
and the propensity to choose a deadline vary with the
structural model parameters in different ways than in
a model with present-biased preferences. Admittedly,
using these predictions for testing is not straightfor-
ward, as it involves the estimation of individuals’ time
preference parameters.
6.4. Behavior—Evidence
There is substantial anecdotal evidence that people’s
plans are suboptimal, and there is informal as well
as formal evidence that people choose to constrain
their future behavior. Informally, people use institu-
tional arrangements such as weight-loss camps, alcohol
clinics, and Christmas clubs as commitment devices.
Formally, Trope and Fishbach (2000), DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006), Thaler and Benartzi (2004), and
Ashraf et al. (2006) document preference for commit-
ment.32 Bryan et al. (2010) review the growing evidence
on the widespread use of commitment devices.
Most directly related to our model are the experi-
ments on deadlines in Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002).
The authors conducted two separate studies: one in
which subjects had to write three academic papers
during the course of the term and one in which subjects
had to proofread three texts in the course of three
weeks. Subjects were randomly assigned into groups:
one that faced externally imposed, equally spaced
deadlines; one in which subjects could self-impose
deadlines; and one that had no deadline option (this
treatment only existed in the proofreading study). This
experimental design resembles but is not identical to
our theoretical setup. First, in our model uncertainty
is resolved only at one point in time, whereas in the
experiments it is possibly resolved over time, since
the amount of work necessary to complete the first
subtask may be informative about the amount neces-
sary to complete the other two. Second, in our model a
32 Trope and Fishbach (2000) find that participants self-impose
penalties for neglecting to undergo minor medical procedures.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) document that a sample of gym
users would have saved almost 70% if they had bought daily passes
instead of gym memberships. In a field experiment, Thaler and
Benartzi (2004) introduce a commitment device that enables people
to commit to a retirement savings plan, and they find that 65%–80%
of people choose to participate. Also in a field experiment on savings
behavior, Ashraf et al. (2006) find that 28% of the subjects choose to
deposit money in savings accounts with withdrawal restrictions.
deadline imposes the minimum amount of work to be
completed in period 1; in the experiments the deadline
specifies the date by which one has to complete one of
the papers, so the deadline requires the completion of
a proportion rather than an absolute amount of work.
Finally, in our model the deadline cannot be violated,
whereas in the experiments performance penalties were
imposed on subjects who missed their deadlines. We
believe that these differences in the environment do
not crucially affect our model’s implications, hence the
possibility to verify them using this experiment.33
Regarding deadlines, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)
found that most people with the option to choose a
deadline did so. For the paper assignments, the mean
deadlines chosen were 42, 26, and 10 days before the
end of the semester for the first, second, and third
paper, respectively, and 73% of deadlines were before
the last week of class. In addition, the mean completion
times of the group without deadlines were significantly
later than the mean self-imposed deadlines, which
were significantly later than the externally imposed,
equally spaced deadlines. This pattern mirrors our
results in Propositions 4 and 5. In terms of performance,
Ariely and Wertenbroch found that subjects given an
externally imposed, equally spaced deadline performed
(as measured by the course grade in the first study
and by the number of errors detected in the second
study) better than subjects who self-imposed a deadline.
Again, this pattern mirrors our results in Propositions 4
and 5, to the extent that it is reasonable to assume that
smoother work profiles produce better performance.34
Finally, we revisit the experiments on the effects
of monetary incentives on beliefs and behavior pre-
sented in Byram (1997) and in Buehler et al. (1997).
Although these studies verify our theory’s prediction
that monetary incentives affect beliefs, the experimental
design they utilize unfortunately does not allow us
to test our theory’s additional prediction that these
monetary incentives also affect behavior that depends on
these beliefs. We first explain why this is the case, and
33 Indeed, in an earlier version of the paper, our model setup allowed
for two shocks, 1 and 2, with the first shock being informative
about the second, and the deadline was of the form 1; i.e., it
required a proportion rather than an absolute amount of work to be
completed in the first period. Our results were qualitatively identical
to our current results. In our current model, we have essentially set
1 = 1 (hence, the deadline is , i.e., an absolute amount); this has
enabled us to simplify the exposition and to more clearly state our
results and the intuition behind them.
34 A concern with this result might be that improved performance on
the task at hand might have come at the cost of reduced performance
on other tasks that also required time as a resource. Ariely and
Wertenbroch (2002) provide evidence against this: they found that
on a final project that was unrelated to the papers, students with
externally imposed deadlines, in fact, performed better (mean score
of 86) than students with self-imposed or no deadlines (mean score
of 77).
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then we propose a refined design that could provide a
powerful test of our theory based on this additional
prediction.
In Buehler et al. (1997), subjects in the control group
were given a payment for the rapid completion of
anagram tasks, and subjects in the treatment group
were also given a payment for the accurate prediction
of task completion times. According to our theory,
the payment for accurate task duration prediction
generates anticipatory utility that is decreasing in
the (absolute) difference between the objective and
subjective expected task duration, which makes optimal
beliefs less optimistic; as already discussed in §6.2,
this prediction is consistent with the experimental
results. Additionally, according to our theory, beliefs
about task duration affect the optimal split of work
between the two periods, w1 and w2, but not the total
amount of work, w1 +w2, hence the task duration.
This is consistent with the experimental result that the
mean actual task duration for both the control and the
treatment group was an identical 505 minutes. That
is, in this experiment, the monetary incentive affects
beliefs but not observed behavior, because observed
behavior—the actual task duration—does not depend
on beliefs.
In Byram (1997), subjects in a treatment group were
given a payment for the rapid completion of an origami
folding task. According to our theory, this payment
generates anticipatory utility that is decreasing in the
subjective expected task duration, which makes optimal
beliefs more optimistic; as already discussed in §6.2,
this prediction is consistent with the experimental
results. As before, according to our theory, beliefs about
task duration affect the optimal split of work between
the two periods, but they do not affect the total amount
of work, hence the task duration. This is consistent
with the experimental result that the median actual
task duration for the control group was 808 minutes,
whereas for the treatment group with the monetary
incentive, it was a statistically insignificantly smaller
708 minutes.35
Now, we propose a refined experimental design
that could test our theory’s prediction that monetary
incentives that affect beliefs also affect behavior that
depends on these beliefs. For a clean test of our predic-
tion, we need a study in which (i) observed behavior
35 We note that the payment for rapid completion may affect task
duration directly by affecting the rate or intensity of work. This
could explain why, in a similar experimental design in a study in
which subjects complete anagrams, Buehler et al. (1997) find that
the mean actual task duration was a statistically significant 21%
smaller (505 minutes versus 700 minutes) for the treatment group
with the payment for rapid completion. In our model, we make the
simplifying assumption that the agent can control the amount of
work but not the rate or intensity of work; therefore our model does
not predict this direct effect that the payment of rapid completion
may have on task duration.
depends on beliefs and (ii) monetary incentives affect
observed behavior only indirectly, through beliefs. The
aforementioned study on the effect of a payment for
accurate task duration prediction presented by Buehler
et al. (1997) satisfies the second condition, since the
payment for rapid completion given to all subjects
ensures that they will not strategically vary the rate
of work, but it does not satisfy the first condition,
since the observed behavior—actual completion time—
does not depend on beliefs. Instead, subjects could
be asked to choose for how long they would like to
work before a break and then to complete the task after
the break; this design closely resembles our model
setup, in which our theory predicts that an incentive
for accurate duration prediction generates an incentive
to hold less optimistic beliefs, hence increasing the
optimal amount of work in the first period (before the
break). On the other hand, the aforementioned studies
on the effect of a payment for rapid task completion
presented by Buehler et al. (1997) and by Byram (1997)
satisfy neither of the stated conditions for a clean test
of our prediction. To satisfy the condition that observed
behavior depends on beliefs, we could modify the
experimental design as suggested above for the case of
a payment for accurate duration prediction, whereas to
satisfy the condition that monetary incentives affect
observed behavior only through beliefs, we would
need to choose a task for which subjects cannot vary
the rate of work; a task whose duration is exogenous
(e.g., playing a piano piece at the prescribed tempo)
would satisfy this requirement.36
7. Concluding Discussion
In this paper, we develop a structural theory of optimal
beliefs that relaxes the assumption of time consistency
in beliefs. We do not impose time inconsistency; rather,
we show that time-inconsistent beliefs are optimal
and are an endogenous cause of the preference for
commitment. We present our theory in the context of
planning and show that, as in the original description
of the planning fallacy by Kahneman and Tversky
(1982), people tend to postpone work because they
hold overoptimistic beliefs about the ease of the task.
The strength of our approach is that these belief biases
are situational, and so our model makes predictions
about when optimism and the planning fallacy are
mitigated or exacerbated.
36 For example, a suitable study could be as follows. Musicians would
be given a list of familiar musical pieces that they would need to
perform at a prescribed tempo (beats per minute). They would first
predict how long it would take them to perform all the pieces, then
they would choose for how long they would want to perform before
taking a break, and finally, they would play the pieces. Different
groups of subjects would be given different monetary incentives for
speed of task completion and accuracy of task duration prediction.
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In our model, as in much recent work in behav-
ioral economics, biases in beliefs are central to the
understanding of behavior, so our theory can be criti-
cized as a step away from the discipline of rationality
that mainstream economics imposes on itself. This
discipline is used to select among models that can all
explain observed choice behavior, and rationality as the
preferred assumption has its appeal in many contexts.
But the appeal of structural models is that they are
useful out of sample, and a parsimonious model that
better represents actual beliefs and preferences is likely
to perform better in such an exercise.
Thus, we replace the discipline of the rationality
assumption with the discipline of data by verifying
that our model’s predictions on beliefs match existing
experimental evidence. In doing so, we provide an
example of how experimental methods and reported
expectations can be used to test and evaluate theoretical
models that fall under the broad heading of behavioral
economics. In particular, we observe causation from
environment and from incentives to reported beliefs
that is consistent with our model and inconsistent
with objective probability assessments. In sum, the
model is consistent with much existing experimental
evidence on misplanning and on the use and effects of
deadlines. The next step would be to further test our
model, by designing experiments with our model’s
specific implications in mind. Another possible step
would be to apply our theory in different contexts
(e.g., the real options framework of investment under
uncertainty) and study how its implications differ from
those from a model with time-inconsistent preferences.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The agent chooses w1 at t = 1 to maximize V1. Using Equa-
tions (1), (3), V1 becomes
Ɛˆ16u4w15+ 4+5u41 +−w1571
which is concave in w1. Using u4w5= − 12w2, the first-order
condition (F.O.C.) yields w†1 48Ɛˆt95= B141 + Eˆ15, where B1 2=
4+5/41 ++5, and imposing w1 ≤ 1 yields our result.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
For parts (i)–(iii), we first argue that optimal beliefs satisfy
B141 + Eˆ15≤ 1: if not, from Equation (5), the optimal work at
t = 1 would be 1, and optimal beliefs could become more
optimistic, yielding anticipatory benefits without altering
behavior, so without cost. Thus, we substitute w1 = B141 + Eˆ15
and w2 = 1 +−w1 into W. Second, optimal time 0 beliefs
are completely optimistic, because W is decreasing in Eˆ0
while w∗1 does not depend on Eˆ0, so optimistic time 0 beliefs
have anticipatory benefits but no distortionary costs. Thus,
we also substitute Eˆ0 = 0 into W0 Now we need to find the
optimal Eˆ1.
Define the following constants:
F 2=41 +5+ 41 +5+21
MB1 2= FB21 +41 − 2B151
GB 2= −2B11
where F > 0 and GB < 0 are obvious, and it is easy to show
that MB1 > 0. Then,
dW
dEˆ1
= −GB −MB1 41 + Eˆ15+2B141 +E50
Setting the derivative to 0, and letting sND1 2= 24B1/MB1 5 and
cND1 2= sND1 −GB/MB1 − 1,
Eˆ†1 = sND1 E+ cND1 0
Imposing the constraints Eˆ0 ≥ 0, Eˆ1 ≥ 0, and B141 + Eˆ15≤ 1, we
have
ƐˆND1 67= 0 if Ɛ67≤NDL 1
ƐˆND1 67= sND1 Ɛ67+ cND1 if NDL < Ɛ67≤NDU 1
ƐˆND1 67=
1
B1
− 1 if NDU < Ɛ671
(10)
where the critical values for Ɛ67 are NDL 2= 4GB +MB15/
42B15− 1 and NDU 2= 4GB +MB1/B15/42B15− 1.
For optimism, we know EˆND0 = 0<E, so we just need to
show EˆND1 <E:
• For E ≤NDL , we have EˆND1 = 0<E.
• For E > NDU , we have Eˆ
ND
1 = 1/B1 − 1, so EˆND1 − E <
1/B1−1−NDU =−4441++5+4+525/424+5255<0.
• For NDL <E ≤NDU , as a function of E, EˆND1 is a straight
line segment whose endpoints lie below the line E, so EˆND1 < E.
For part (iv), the planning fallacy is that ƐˆNDt 6w
∗
1 +w∗2 7 <
Ɛ6w∗1 +w∗2 7 for t = 0 and t = 1. Using Equation (1), this simply
becomes Ɛˆt67 < Ɛt67, which we have shown above to be
true, since optimal beliefs are optimistic.
For part (v), substituting optimal beliefs from Equation (10)
and objective beliefs into Equation (5), we have wND1 =
min811B141 + EˆND1 59 and wRE1 = min811B141 +E59, respectively.
We showed above that EˆND1 <E, so w
ND
1 ≤wRE1 .
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
For part (i), if E ≤ 1/B1 − 1, we have w∗14Ɛ5= B141 +E5≤ 1,
so we can substitute w1 =w∗14Ɛ5 and w2 = 1 +−w1 in W.
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Differentiating it with respect to (w.r.t.) èˆ0 and èˆ1, we have
dW/dèˆ0 = − 122 and dW/dèˆ1 = − 12, both negative. If
E > 1/B1 − 1, use Eˆ1 = E in Equation (5), so we can use
w∗14Ɛ5= 1 and w2 =  in W. Differentiating it w.r.t. èˆ0 and
èˆ1, we have dW/dèˆ0 = − 122 and dW/dèˆ1 = − 12, both
negative.
For part (ii), we require that variances are nonnegative, so
(i) implies that optimal variances are 0.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4
A.4.1. Step 1—Optimal Work Given Arbitrary Deadline
and Arbitrary Beliefs. Combining a deadline of the form
w1 ≥  with the result from Proposition 1, the optimal work
is w∗148Ɛˆt915= min811max81B141 + Eˆ1599.
A.4.2. Step 2—Optimal Deadline Given Optimal Work
and Arbitrary Beliefs. A deadline  6∈ 6w∗1117 is ignored at
t = 1, so at t = 0, the agent chooses  ∈ 6w∗1117 to maximize V0.
So at t = 1, the agent chooses w∗148Ɛˆt915=. Substituting
in V0 and differentiating yields dV0/d ∝ −8−D041 + Eˆ05−
D141 + Eˆ159, where D0 2= 42 +25/42 +2 +++5,
D1 2= 45/42 +2 +++5. Imposing  ∈ 6w∗1117,
∗48Ɛˆt95= B141 + Eˆ15
if D041 + Eˆ05+D141 + Eˆ15≤ B141 + Eˆ15≤ 11
∗48Ɛˆt95=D041 + Eˆ05+D141 + Eˆ15
if B141 + Eˆ15≤D041 + Eˆ05+D141 + Eˆ15≤ 11
∗48Ɛˆt95= 1 otherwise.
We will show below that optimal beliefs are optimistic;
combined with D0 +D1 <B1, this trivially proves that the
optimal deadline is smaller than wRE1 = B141 +E5.
A.4.3. Step 3—Optimal Beliefs Given Optimal Work
and Optimal Deadline. The optimality of complete overcon-
fidence trivially follows from the assumption of quadratic
utility, so we turn our attention to optimal expectations. They
must satisfy B141 + Eˆ15 ≤ 1, D041 + Eˆ05+D141 + Eˆ15 ≤ 1. If
not, from our expressions for w∗148Ɛˆt915, 
∗48Ɛˆt95, we see
that optimal work at t = 1 would be 1, and optimal beliefs
could become more optimistic, yielding anticipatory benefits
without altering behavior, so without cost. Thus we need
only consider two cases.
First, let ∗48Ɛˆt95= B141 + Eˆ15. Working as in §A.2, we find
the same optimal beliefs, which indeed satisfy D041 + Eˆ05+
D141 + Eˆ15≤ B141 + Eˆ15≤ 1.
Second, let ∗48Ɛˆt95=D041 + Eˆ05+D141 + Eˆ15. Next, we
find optimal beliefs and check when B141 + Eˆ15≤D041 + Eˆ05+
D141 + Eˆ15≤ 1 is satisfied.
Substituting for w∗148Ɛˆt91
∗48Ɛˆt955 in W and ignoring the
constraints, the first-order conditions w.r.t. Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 yield
Eˆ†0 = s¯D0 41+E5−1 and Eˆ†1 = s¯D1 41+E5−1, where s¯D0 2= 442D21 +
D041 −D155/4MD0MD1 −G2D552 and s¯D1 2= 442D141 −D05+
D205/4MD0MD1 −G2D552, with
GD 2= FD0D1 −2D1 −D01 MD0 2= FD20 +241 − 2D051
MD1 2= FD21 +41 − 2D150
Algebra shows thatGD < 0,MD0 > 0,MD1 > 0, andMD0MD1>G
2
D ,
and also that Eˆ†0 ≥ Eˆ†1 .
Imposing Eˆ0 ≥ 0, Eˆ1 ≥ 0, and D041 + Eˆ05+D141 + Eˆ15≤ 1,
but temporarily ignoring D041 + Eˆ05≥ 4B1 −D1541 + Eˆ15, the
possible optimal beliefs are (see §B.2.1 in the online appendix
for details)
Ɛˆ††0 67=0= Ɛˆ††1 67=0 if Ɛ67≤DL 1
Ɛˆ††0 67= sD0 Ɛ67+cD0 > Ɛˆ††1 67=0 if DL <Ɛ67≤DI 1
Ɛˆ††0 67= s¯D0 41+Ɛ675−1> Ɛˆ††1 67= s¯D1 41+Ɛ675−1
if DI <Ɛ67≤DU 1
Ɛˆ††0 67=
s¯D0
D0s¯
D
0 +D1s¯D1
−1> Ɛˆ††1 67=
s¯D1
D0s¯
D
0 +D1s¯D1
−1
if DU <Ɛ671
(11)
with DL 2=−cD0 /sD0 1DI 2=1/s¯D1 −1, DU 2=1/4D0s¯D0 +D1s¯D1 5−1,
sD0 2= 42D05/MD0 , cD0 2= sD0 −GD/MD0 −1.
Now we impose D041 + Eˆ05≥ 4B1 −D1541 + Eˆ15. The con-
straint clearly binds for E <DL , and it either stops binding at
E =DL′ ∈ 6DL 1DI 7 or never stops binding. This is because
(i) in 4DL 1
D
I 7, Eˆ
††
0 is increasing and Eˆ
††
1 is constant, so the
constraint relaxes as E increases, and (ii) for E > DI , the
constraint does not depend on E. So using Equation (11),
we find that the constraint always binds if and only if
4B1 −D15s¯D1 ≤D0s¯D0 , which is equivalent to
≥ ¯L45 2=
(
3
√√
31
108
+ 1
2
− 1
3
1
3
√√
31/108 + 1/2
)
≈ 00680
Next, we examine these two cases.
Case 1: ≥ ¯L45. In this case, the constraint D041 + Eˆ05≥
4B1 −D1541 + Eˆ15 binds only up to E equal to DL′ 2= 1/sD0 ·
44B1 −D1 −D05/D0 − cD0 5; to determine this, we use Eˆ††1 = 0
for E ≤DI in the constraint. So EˆD0 = 4B1 −D1 −D05/D0 and
EˆD1 = 0 for E ≤DL′ , while for E >DL′ , optimal beliefs are as in
Equation (11) (simply replace †† with D). Finally, we can
show that
NDL <
D
L′ <
D
I <
ND
U <
D
U if ¯L45 < ≤ ¯451
DL′ <
ND
L <
D
I <
ND
U <
D
U if ¯45 < ≤ ¯U 451
DL′ <
ND
L <
D
I <
D
U <
ND
U if ¯U 45 < 1
where ¯45 and ¯U 45 are increasing in  (see §B.2.1 in the
online appendix for details).
To check whether a binding deadline is optimally imposed
or not, we need to compare the well-being W with and
without a deadline, WD and WND, respectively. First, we
observe that optimal beliefs are piecewise linear in E and
WD −WND is a quadratic in beliefs, so WD −WND is a differ-
entiable piecewise quadratic in E. Using this fact, together
with some algebra, we can show (see §B.2.1 in the online
appendix for details) that WD ≥WND if and only if ≥ ¯45
and E ∈M415, where M415 is a convex set. If a bind-
ing deadline is not optimal, then optimal beliefs are as in
Equation (10).
Case 2: < ¯L45. Here, the constraint 4B1 −D1541 + Eˆ15≤
D041 + Eˆ05 binds for all E. Thus optimal beliefs implementing
the binding deadline must always be proportional, so they
are both constants or both proportional to E. Given that we
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have the constraints Eˆ0 ≥ 0, Eˆ1 ≥ 0, and w1 ≤ 1, we conclude
that there are values of E, DI ′ , and 
D
U ′ to be defined below
that partition the E space in regions: for E ≤ DI ′ , optimal
beliefs do not depend on E because Eˆ0 ≥ 0 and Eˆ1 ≥ 0 bind;
for DI ′ <E ≤DU ′ , optimal beliefs are proportional to E; and
for DU ′ < E, optimal beliefs do not depend on E because
w1 ≤ 1 binds. Working as above, we find
Ɛˆ††0 67=
B1 −D1 −D0
D0
> Ɛˆ††1 67= 0 if Ɛ67≤DI ′ 1
Ɛˆ††0 67= s¯D′0 41 + Ɛ675− 1> Ɛˆ††1 67= s¯D′1 41 + Ɛ675− 1
if DI ′ < Ɛ67≤DU ′1
Ɛˆ††0 67=
1
B1
B1 −D1
D0
− 1> Ɛˆ††1 67=
1
B1
− 1 if DU ′ < Ɛ671
with
s¯D
′
0 2=
B1
2
2GD + 44B1 −D15/D05MD0 + 4D0MD1 5/4B1 −D15
1
s¯D
′
1 2=
D0
B1
B1 −D1 +D0
B1 −D1
s¯D
′
0 1
DI ′ 2=
1
s¯D
′
1 − 1
1 DU ′ 2=
1
D0s¯
D′
0 +D1s¯D′1
− 10
Finally, WD <WND everywhere (see §B.2.1 in the online
appendix for details), so a deadline is never optimal and
optimal beliefs are as in Equation (10).
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5
A.5.1. Finding the Optimal Beliefs. We work as in
§§A.4.1 and A.4.2 to find w∗148Ɛˆt915 and 
∗1ED48Ɛˆt95, the
optimal externally imposed deadline given beliefs. Note that
∗1ED48Ɛˆt95 is like ∗48Ɛˆt95 in §A.4.2, except E replaces Eˆ0 every-
where. We are interested in optimal beliefs that implement a
binding deadline, so as in §A.4, we differentiate W w.r.t. Eˆ01 Eˆ1
to find (i) dW/dEˆ0 <0, so with Eˆ0 ≥0, we have EˆED0 = 0; and
(ii) “interior” optimal Eˆ1 is Eˆ†1 = 44241 +E5+25/MD1 5D1 − 1.
Also, (i) substituting EˆED0 and Eˆ
†
1 in B141 + Eˆ15 ≤ D0 ·
41 +E5+D141 + Eˆ15, we see that it does not bind for these
beliefs. (ii) Setting Eˆ†1 = 44241 +E5+25/MD1 5D1 − 1 = 0, we
see that Eˆ1 ≥ 0 binds for E < EDI 2= 1/24MD1/D1 −25−
1 = 4+5/2 > 0. (iii) For EˆED0 = EˆED1 = 0, B141 + Eˆ15 ≤
D041 +E5+D141 + Eˆ15 binds at E = EDL 2= 4B1 −D1 −D05/
D0 = 45/442 +2541 ++55≤EDI ; but it cannot be satis-
fied for E <EDL , neither by reducing Eˆ0, Eˆ1 (which would
be impossible) nor by raising them (which would not be
helpful), so no beliefs implement the externally imposed
binding deadline for E ≤ EDL . (iv) Substituting EˆED0 , Eˆ†1 in
D041 + E5+D141 + Eˆ15≤ 1, we see that it binds for E >EDU 2=
4MD1 −2D215/4D0MD1 +2D215− 1; using E =EDU in Eˆ†1 , we
get EˆED1 = 442 +2D05/4D0MD1 +2D2155D1 − 1 for E >EDU .
We have shown EˆED0 = 0 ≤ EˆED1 ; i.e., beliefs become more
pessimistic over time. So to prove optimism, we just need to
show EˆED1 ≤ E. For E ≤EDI , we have EˆED1 = 0< E. For EDU < E,
we have EˆED1 = 442 +2D05/4D0MD1 +2D2155D1 − 1<EDU .
For EDI <E ≤EDU , as a function of E, EˆED1 is a straight line
segment whose endpoints lie below the line E, so EˆED1 <E.
Having determined optimal beliefs ƐˆEDt , we define 
ED 2=
∗1ED48ƐˆEDt 95.
A.5.2. Outsider’s Deadline Is Stricter than the Agent’s
Deadline. To show this, we need to show ED ≥ D; i.e.,
D04E− EˆD0 5≥D14EˆD1 − EˆED1 5. Straightforward algebra shows
this is true for interior beliefs (so also for beliefs above the
interior). Now we show it is true for all remaining beliefs for
which a binding self-imposed deadline is optimal. From §A.4,
we know this is the case only if E >DL , so we simply need
to check the case where EˆD1 = 0. But we already know from
§A.4 that EˆD0 ≤ E; hence D04E− EˆD0 5≥D14EˆD1 − EˆED1 5.
A.5.3. Outsider’s Deadline Is Smaller than wRE1 . We have
shown that beliefs are optimistic; combined with D0 +D1 <B1,
this trivially proves ED <wRE1 .
A.6. Proof of Proposition 6
The unconstrained optimal beliefs without a deadline are
EˆND0 = 0 (so dEˆND0 /d= dEˆND0 /d= 0) and EˆND1 = sND1 E+ cND1 ,
while the optimal work is wND1 = B141+ EˆND1 5. Straightforward
but tedious algebra shows that dEˆND1 /d> 0, dw
ND
1 /d> 0,
and dEˆND1 /d< 0.
To determine the effect of  on wND1 , we first determine
its effect on the endpoints of its nonhorizontal segment. The
left endpoint moves right by dNDL /d and up by dB1/d,
so we calculate B1sND1 4d
ND
L /d5− dB1/d∝−, which
means that as  increases, the left endpoint is above the
original nonhorizontal segment if and only if >. The right
endpoint moves right by dNDU /d∝ 4+53 +4−5,
which is positive for ≤ ¯45 and negative for > ¯45.
Thus, for ≤ , dwND1 /d< 0; for <≤ ¯45, dwND1 /d> 0
for small E and dwND1 /d< 0 for large E; and for ¯45 <,
dwND1 /d> 0.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 7
In this case, the unconstrained optimal beliefs are (see Equa-
tion (11)) EˆD0 = s¯D0 41+E5−1 and EˆD1 = s¯D1 41+E5−1. The optimal
deadline is D =D041 + EˆD0 5+D141 + EˆD1 5. Straightforward but
tedious algebra shows that dEˆD0 /d∝ dEˆD1 /d∝ 1+E > 0 and
dD/d> 0 and also that dEˆD0 /d∝ dEˆD1 /d∝ −41 + E5 < 0
and dD/d< 0.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 8
A.8.1. Optimal Work. Optimal work at t = 1 maximizes
V1 = Ɛ6U1 + U27. Use Ut , w2 = 1 +  −w1, to write the
objective as Ɛ6u4w15+4+5u41+−w157, which is concave
in w1. Ignoring w1 ≤ 1 and substituting for u4 · 5, the F.O.C.
w.r.t. w1 yields w†1 = B˜41 +E5 for B˜ 2= 4+5/41 + 4+55.
Imposing w1 ≤ 1 yields wH1 .
A.8.2. Optimal Work Given Arbitrary Deadline. With
a deadline w1 ≥, the optimal work is wH1 45=min811
max81wH1 99=min811 max81B˜41+E599.
A.8.3. Optimal Deadline Given Optimal Work. As in
previous proofs, we can restrict our attention to  ∈ 6wH1 117, so
wH1 45= . Thus the optimal deadline at t = 0 maximizes V0
subject to  ∈ 6wH1 117. Manipulating this, we get
V0 ∝ − 12
{
2 + D˜641 +E52 +è− 241 +E57}
dV0
d
∝ −{− D˜41 +E5}1
so imposing  ∈ 6wH1 117, we get H = B˜41 + E5 if D˜ ≤ B˜ ≤
1/41 + E5, H = D˜41 + E5 if B˜ ≤ D˜ ≤ 1/41 + E5, and H = 1
otherwise, where D˜ 2= 42 ++25/42 ++++25.
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Note that D˜−B˜= 441−564−52 +442−35/41−5575/
442 ++2++2541+4+555. For <1, D˜−B˜=0 is
a conic section with discriminant 4/41−552 −4. For < 23
we have D˜−B˜>0; for = 23 , we have D˜−B˜=0 for = and
D˜−B˜>0 otherwise. So the deadline is not chosen only for
> 23 and D˜−B˜<0, where D˜−B˜=0 is a degenerate hyperbola,
which can be written as = 42 +25/42 +2 +5.
A.9. Proof of Proposition 9
If D˜ ≤ B˜ ≤ 1/41+E5, a deadline is not chosen, so wH1 = B˜41+E5,
and
dwH1
d
= 
41 + + 52 41 +E5 > 01
dwH1
d
= 
41 + + 52 41 +E5 > 00
If B˜ ≤ D˜≤ 1/41 +E5, the deadline binds, so H = D˜41 +E5=
42 + +25/42 ++ ++2541 +E5, and
dH
d
= 
2 + 2+ 2 −2
42 ++ ++252 41 +E51
dH
d
= −
2 + 2 + 2+2
42 ++ ++252 41 +E50
Thus, dH/d> 0 ⇔  > 42 − 2−25/2 and dH/d>
0 ⇔  > 42 − 2−25/2.
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